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1. Introduction: Norway – trapped by the resource curse or moving towards a 
knowledge-based society? 
 
Norway is performing remarkably well. For several years in a row the United Nations has 
named Norway the best country in the world to live in (Human Development Reports). The 
population enjoys one of the highest levels of GDP per capita, an egalitarian distribution of 
wealth, and generous welfare state arrangements. Yet, Norway is trailing the other Nordic 
countries in terms of economic dynamism. On the World Economic Forum’s ranking lists, 
Norway has been ranked lowest among the Nordic countries and has most recently dropped 
significantly behind. The country is ranked very low on international innovation scoreboards 
(cf. EIS), is blamed for investing too little in R&D, less than 1.7 per cent of GDP which is 
well below the OECD average, and is less integrated into the globalized economy than the 
other Nordic countries. Are these indicators symptoms of a nation about to be trapped by the 
paradox of plenty? Has Norway failed to sustain and develop a dynamic and competitive 
economy for future challenges?    
 
There is no doubt that Norway owes her wealth to oil windfalls. The petroleum sector 
accounts for more than one fourth of GDP and for more than 60 per cent of the value of 
commodity exports. Norway’s strong dependence on natural resources is unique in the group 
of advanced industrial economies. Nevertheless, the political awareness of this state of affairs 
is high, and the notion of being in control of the situation has allowed the unique resource 
dependency to develop. Within the system of economic governance a framework of 
institutional constraints has been constructed for preventing the abuse spending of oil money 
at home. Over all the economic governance regime sticks to a strict national budget policy: oil 
incomes are recycled into international finance markets, so linking Norway to the increasing 
flow of petro-dollars. The result is an oil fund that for the time being amounts to almost $ 300 
billion. Furthermore, a positive balance of trade, no state debt, and low levels of 
unemployment together with a high level of labour participation is legitimizing Norway’s 
peculiar pathway.   
 
Two sets of factors have helped Norway achieve her unique financial and economic position: 
in addition to macro-economic regulation, the refinement of core technologies for the 
exploitation and extension of natural resources. Still, the key issue is whether national 
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strategies have provided the economy with relevant skills and sufficient transformative 
power? Investigating this issue does not provide any obvious answer. On the one hand, 
Norway has abandoned developmental policies, and has been alone in experiencing an actual 
decline in total manufacturing output among advanced industrial economies.  The effect is 
that the competence base has been narrowed down (Andersson et al. 2004:27, OECD 2007a). 
On the other hand, the economy is for the time being demonstrating surprising elements of 
renewal in terms of both productivity growth and the emergence of new science and 
technology based sectors. Recently, Norway presented the highest productivity level in the 
world in terms of GDP per hour worked (OECD 2007). Technologically, it has become a 
leader in offshore solutions, and emergent clusters in ICT and biotech are attracting 
international attention. 
 
The case is that Norway presents a mixed picture of inertia and dynamism, and from the 
outside it is not obvious what sort of institutional reforms are triggering a renewal of the 
economy. Since the 1980s the public sector has recurrently been subject to reforms, although 
less radical than in the other Nordic countries. This chapter will explore different sub-systems 
and sectors of the national business system in search for institutional change that enable firms 
and individuals to initiate experimental activities and to redefine themselves. The point of 
departure for this search is the case study of a selection of innovative firms. These firms 
demonstrate both high flexibility and a global visibility, and the inferences drawn from the 
analysis serve as reference points as to what sort of institutional resources innovative driven 
firms make use of. How and to what extent do public reforms open for supply oriented 
services? To what extent have public institutions co-evolved with private partners? The 
degree of match between institutional resources and ongoing transformation in the 
international economy will be informative as to how far Norway has moved towards an 
enabling welfare state.  
 
The next section sketches the traditional Norwegian business system for a review of historical 
structures and institutions supporting a natural resource based economy. The third section 
points out key reforms within the economic governance system and the public sector; the 
fourth section gives an account of the case studies; the fifth section compares institutional 
reforms in Norway with reforms in the other Nordic countries; and the last section 
summarizes the present state of the Norwegian business system.   
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2. The traditional Norwegian business system: the exploitation of natural resources 
 
Through history the Norwegian economy has repeatedly been framed by the exploitation of 
natural resources: fish; timber; minerals; water power; and most recently oil and gas. For 
certain reasons business activities have largely been restricted to the export of raw materials 
and semi-finished products. Within the dual Danish-Norwegian monarchy this role was 
politically decided: Norway was to generate incomes through the export of natural resources 
whereas Denmark was given the privilege of developing trade and handicrafts. With the 
breakthrough of modern industrialization in late 19th century this industrial practice was 
reproduced. At the time this was not only related to organizational skills and routines, but also 
a resultant outcome of the then situational context. Since Norway for all practical purposes 
had been a colony for some hundred years, modern capitalist institutions such as a financial 
system were under-developed. For example, Hamburg was during the first part of 19th century 
a financial centre for Norwegian international business.  
 
Lacking an effective finance system, an industrial firm was often constituted as a family 
owned enterprise, a few large companies except. Therefore, a dominant way of financing 
industrialization took place through reinvestments and/or inter-firm financing within networks 
of related families. In the Norwegian context family ownership meant a personalized and 
strong centralized control. The strong autonomy orientation inherent in this system gave few 
incentives for risk sharing. Traditional economic practice and the institutional setting for 
controlling and coordinating economic activities have framed firms’ patterns of growth, the 
scope of business activities, and the nature of cooperative and competitive relations. To put it 
differently, the combination of bulk business and narrow spans of control has shaped a 
distinct national understanding of how to earn money: concentration on one single activity, i. 
e. the processing of raw materials. This practice has been reproduced at critical junctures.  
The narrow span of control favours organic growth and discourages diversification since 
external capital or new skills are to be avoided. In this way of understanding business 
competitiveness is achieved through cost reduction. Moreover, specialization restricts the 
development of cross-functional capabilities within firms, necessitating the externalization of 
complementary activities. This form of specialization debars firms from developing a 
customer orientation and from information about market trends. Lastly, the internalization of 
risks rules out risk sharing with suppliers, customers, and bankers. Typically, the majority of 
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Norwegian firms were and still are small and medium-sized enterprises and many of these are 
life-bread operations.1 
 
The way firms are constituted impacts on the nature of intra- and inter-organizational 
relationships as well. Coordination across organizational boundaries has in particular proven 
to be challenging when it conflicts with owners’ prerogatives. For this reason autonomous 
firms in Norway have often demonstrated an unwillingness to merge and to integrate 
vertically and horizontally2. The bank-based coordination system that evolved in both 
Sweden and Finland did not take place in Norway, nor the cooperative kind of inter-firm 
organization of production and distribution typical among small and medium-sized firms in 
Denmark. However, during the economic crises in the interwar period this governance system 
was modified to some extent through the construction of sector level coordination. For 
example in several manufacturing industries cartels were not only allowed but also to some 
degree encouraged as it was considered ‘good governance’ (Nordby 1994, Hanisch et al. 
1999, Moen 1998). This practice remained unchanged during most of the postwar period.   
                                                
 
In the postwar period the national business system was further modified: first by an active 
state, and secondly through the system of industrial relations. A majority government 
provided the Labour Party with strong political potential, and its ambition of regulating the 
economy was equally strong. Under the guidance of leading economists from the renowned 
Oslo School, leading Labour politicians were convinced that administrative systems for a 
scientific exploitation of resources could replace the market. As to planning, the Oslo 
economists took a stronger stance than Keynes. Subsequently, the Norwegian planning 
economy developed a comparatively high degree of state control, planning, and centralization. 
In this way the state not only shared risks with business, but took on major responsibility for 
developing the economy.  
 
Labour’s main tool for framing the economic development was politically governed credit 
rationing and low interest rates. Credits were allocated to politically prioritized projects that 
included the generation of hydro-electrical power, metal processing and ship building. Tools 
for allocating financial resources were private banks and over time an increasing number of 
 
1 By international standards Norwegian firms are rather small. In 1995, 80 per cent of all employees were 
employed in firms with less than five employees (Moen 2002:61). 
2 For example, a strong cost focus and lack of risk sharing has led to industrial decline as was the case of the 
pulp and paper industry (Moen 1998).  
 6
different state banks or funds that were to serve specific sectors and aims. In addition to this 
type of ‘selective’ industrial policies, the regulation regime developed a wide set of planning 
tools: ownership or owner stakes in manufacturing companies, the set-up of institutional and 
corporative arrangements let alone protective measures. Yet, the most prioritized sector in 
terms of direct financial support was agriculture. This formed part of regional or district 
policies, a ‘sacred’ policy area in Norway (Hanisch et al. 1999, Knutsen 1995).   
 
In the aftermath of World War II Labour declared the overarching goal for the economy to be 
industrial diversification. Due to institutional inconsistencies this goal did not materialize. 
Labour’s Fordist model of industrialization clashed with management’s discretion and strong 
autonomy orientation. The coordination of large-scale operations conflicted with the existing 
structure of small and medium-sized enterprises. Moreover, Labour’s strong ambition of 
controlling the economy exacerbated latent tensions with a conservative management that 
feared nationalization. Traditionally, there was weak capacity for strategic cooperation 
between the state and private business. This state of affairs is linked to a divide in the wider 
Norwegian society. Through the work of Rokkan (1967) this divide is generally known as the 
centre-periphery cleavage. This cleavage refers to a dominant centre with access to critical 
resources and a periphery partly excluded from the same resources.3   
 
The weak capacity for cross-sectoral cooperation impacted on how industrialization processes 
unfolded. When Labour failed to develop a shared understanding with Norwegian 
management as to appropriate type of industrialization, the objective of diversifying the 
economy in cooperation with the private sector was largely abandoned. The pragmatic 
solution found was a strengthening of the exploitation of natural resources, principally in 
terms of hydro-electrical power. This strategy was realized by extending the supply of hydro-
electrical power, and by either establishing state owned companies or by favouring private 
ones within the energy intensive sectors such as electro-metallurgy and electro-chemistry. 
Favoured companies were given both cheap loans and subsidies in the form of long-term 
contracts for the supply of cheap energy. This type of state-led industrialization was 
successful and was nick-named ‘power socialism’ and had strong support among large groups 
                                                 
3 Eckstein (1966:180-1) in his study of Norwegian democracy related the paradox between the salience of 
segmental cleavages and cultural divergences and an ’overarching attitude of solidarity’ to three kinds of 
behaviour: ’noneconomic (primordial) definitions of human behaviour, non-competitiveness, and great 
organizability, i. e. the similarity of Norwegian authority patterns because it involves homogeneity in a realm of 
social experience related closely to political life.   
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within Labour. By 1970 Norway had become the largest exporter of ferro alloys and the 
second largest of magnesium in the world, and the second largest exporter of aluminium in 
Europe  
 
This kind of production system was simple to manage. Typically, companies within the 
process industries were run with an emphasis on volume and cost reduction in up-stream 
operations. Production facilities were located in scattered and peripheral areas that gave rise 
to a large number of mono-industrial towns, a hallmark of Norwegian postwar 
industrialization. Since a large part of input factors – raw materials and machinery – were 
imported, state owned or state supported companies developed few ties to the rest of the 
economy and they functioned more or less as isolated enclaves. Price fluctuations on raw 
materials and semi-finished products had few socio-economic ramifications. The energy 
intensive industry employed only about five per cent of the work force, and economic 
volatility could easily be handled through stock and import management (Moen 2002). 
 
For these reasons Norway developed less institutional arrangements for cross-sectoral 
coordination such as the bank based coordination system in Finland and Sweden. Instead 
Norway developed a strong system of intra-sectoral coordination (Hernes 1978), and links 
between the state and private business assumed rather a clientistic nature than strategic 
cooperation.  
 
Yet, different mechanisms within the Norwegian political system function to mediate divides. 
One such mechanism is the Norwegian election system, which is based on a geographical seat 
allocation favouring peripheral and rural constituencies. Over time this system has created 
strong inter-dependencies between elites in the polity and the periphery. However, one effect 
of such inter-dependencies is a mix of different policy areas. Another effect is that 
competition between constituencies has triggered power games and horse-trading. Typically, 
these types of political games tend to provide sub-optimal performance outcomes. Another 
mediating mechanism is the system of centralized wage bargaining. In the Norwegian context 
this system developed an unusual capacity for cross-sectoral coordination and cooperation. 
The system of wage bargaining emerged after the turn of the last century, and a peak was 
reached in the mid-1930s when a general agreement was reached between the social partners 
centrally.  
 
 8
The strong capacity for cross-sectoral cooperation enabled the system of industrial relations to 
reform managerial practices and work organization in the postwar period. The 
institutionalization of co-determination and the principle of local union representation in 
boards have facilitated reforms in work practice and organization.  In fact, Norway was a 
pioneer in work organization experimenting. In the early 1960s a joint project between the 
Norwegian Federations of Trade Unions, the Norwegian Employers Confederation, the 
government, and Norwegian and British researchers was launched as one of the first in 
Europe. The tripartite programme was called the Industrial Democracy Programme and 
implemented at the shop floor level. The objective of the programme was to develop new 
ideas for cooperation and work organization (Gustavsen et al. 2001). Through these trail 
blazing programmes the trade unions adopted a positive attitude to technological change. For 
increasing efficiency and process optimization these sorts of cooperative relations have been 
vital. But also for developing the welfare state the system of corporative industrial relations 
has been a driver.  
 
At critical junctures work organization experimentation was initiated through programmes for 
technological development. A technology programme had been implemented after World War 
II, and it became particularly relevant after Norway joined the NATO in 1949. A minor, but 
influential, group within Labour wanted to use technology strategically in Norway’s defence 
and security policies. When Norway joined NATO, the decision was made to develop a 
domestic weapon industry and to connect the development of this industry to NATO’s 
military strategy. To achieve this goal several research institutions were set up and 
government funded technological research programmes established4. One resultant outcome 
is that a couple of state companies was upgraded, first and foremost Kongsberg Weapon 
Factory.  Later the technology programme was extended to comprise telecommunication. 
Within this field participation in the pan-Nordic research collaboration, that spearheaded the 
Nordic countries to the frontier of mobile telecommunication, became of particular 
importance. However, by contrast to the other Nordic countries these investments did not 
materialize in any commercial success as was the case of Nokia in Finland and Ericsson in 
Sweden. Due to lack of institutional support – funding, the understanding of long-term 
                                                 
4 These institutions comprised a research council for science and technology, and sector based research institutes 
like the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) and its spin-off the Institute of Nuclear Energy in 
addition to a large number of sector based research institutes. 
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industrial strategies – and cross-sectoral cooperation, Norway failed to capitalize on her 
technological achievements in mobile telecommunication technology.    
  
When the Norwegian oil sector emerged in the 1970s, its structure, routines, and patterns of 
interaction were largely shaped in line with the planning tradition of the postwar period. 
There was a strong ambition for controlling the exploitation of oil, and the authorities decided 
not to confine their roles only to property rights management and tax collection, but to play an 
active part. Statoil, a Labour Party construction, was to be the state’s most important tool. To 
get political consensus for an active policy, a National Project for developing the North Sea 
was constructed (Olsen 1989:34). In exchange for developing the North Sea, petroleum 
incomes were to be used as an instrument for regional development and for diversifying the 
Norwegian economy. The main objective of the National Project was to develop national 
competences for exploring and exploiting Norwegian resources. By transferring knowledge to 
other business sectors, research institutes, and universities, the rest of the economy was to be 
upgraded and diversified. The strategy was to learn from foreign oil companies, and different 
incentives schemes were introduce for encouraging oil companies to engage Norwegian 
suppliers (Hanisch et al 1999). One such incentive is a risk sharing arrangement with the 
state: costs connected with the searching for oil and related investments are eligible for tax 
reduction. 
 
Thus, the state took on responsibility for developing the Norwegian shelf and in rhetoric also 
for diversifying the economy to counter-balance the impact of a petroleum economy. But so 
far diversification in relation to the exploitation of oil has not materialized, apart from one 
exception to be dealt with below. The Norwegian oil sector has been and is dominated by the 
production of crude oil. In a sort of ’taken-for-granted’ manner, activities have mainly been 
restricted to process optimization and to increased recovery of existing oil fields.5   
 
 
3. Change and continuity in the national business system: increased centralization and 
new social spaces 
 
The redefinition of the economic governance regime 
                                                 
5 Vertical integration has taken place to the extent that Statoil has invested in down-stream activities; retailing. 
Attempts of diversifying into chemical activities were abandoned.  
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Failure to deal with the crises in the 1970s and to stabilize the volatility in the 1980s 
discredited the postwar planning economy. The fact that all state owned industrial companies 
for all practical purposes had been a commercial failure likewise destroyed confidence in the 
regime. Armed with new public management (NPM) templates the governance regime started 
to reform itself from within. In the first place this concerned the redefinition of the role of the 
state, and secondly the deregulation of most industrial sectors. The ideological shift 
underlying the reform processes was radical and was referred to as the ‘from plan to market’ 
(Løken and Trygstad 2006). Competition was to replace planning for improving quality, 
efficiency, and effectiveness. The financial system, the public sector, the system of higher 
education, and industrial sectors such as energy, telecommunication, parts of mass media, 
which all had been monopolies, were gradually subject to reforms. However, the 
transformation movement was less internally coherent than the ideological shift signalled.  
 
The redefinition of the role of the state represented the most substantial action. From being 
the key player in the economy, it relegated itself to the background. First, the state 
deregulated the financial system; secondly it withdrew as an active player in industrialization. 
State companies were either closed down or sold. Thirdly, ‘selective’ industrial policies were 
abandoned. Instead market regulation was to secure a healthy industrial and business 
development, at least in rhetoric.6 Lastly, postwar technology programmes were dismantled. 
For all practical purposes these reforms meant the end of development policies. The economic 
governance regime to replace planning was solely to be based on macroeconomic regulation. 
The main regulatory tool was a fixed rate system introduced in 1986. With the dismantling of 
planning, the central wage bargaining system became of importance for a cross-sectoral 
coordination at the national level.  
 
The state stepped down as an active player in business, but the fact is that its influence in the 
economy has mot diminished. On the contrary, its economic capacity has grown and is 
stronger than ever. This is due to the fact that oil revenues have made the state rich. As a 
result of deregulation the state’s direct and indirect ownership in the domestic stock market 
has increased. Between 1985 and 1996 public ownership doubled. In this period the share of 
public ownership at Oslo Stock Exchange increased from 9 to 21 per cent. The state had 
                                                 
6 The primary sectors and related businesses such as the food industry were except from market governance as 
was the area of district policies. 
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ownership stakes in 29 out of the 100 largest companies in Norway (Moen 2002). This is 
partly a result of the part-privatization and listing of state companies, and partly a result of 
heavy state investments in the biggest banks in the early 1990s to alleviate a domestic bank 
crisis. Today the state controls as much as 45 per cent of the shares on Oslo Stock Exchange 
(Grünfeld and Jakobsen 2006). Consequently, the share of private investment is very low. In 
Norway private investments amount only to 15 per cent of GDP whereas in Sweden they 
amount to 80 per cent of GDP (OECD 2008a). At the same time Norway has the lowest share 
of market capitalization of GDP among the Nordic countries (Sinani et al. 2008:30-31).  
 
Thus, in contrast to the postwar period the state is not playing an active role in business, but 
indirectly its economic position is stronger than ever.  At the same time the recycling of oil 
incomes into global financial markets has de-coupled the state from interaction with the non-
petroleum part of the economy. In fact, oil windfalls has made it almost independent vis-à-vis 
other societal spheres. It is likely to consider the dismantling of developmental policies and 
the end of a number of risk sharing arrangements in this perspective, likewise the 
reinforcement of a natural resource based economy. This political economy orientation is 
stronger than ever entrenched in the political and administrative leadership. The governance 
mechanisms linked with the centralized wage bargaining is further strengthening this 
orientation. The Norwegian model, which is based on the Rehn-Meider model of 
development, is in tune with an economy based on the refinement of natural resources and 
process optimization.7 Since there is a shared understanding between the tripartite partners, 
there is no forceful alternative to contest this type of political economy orientation. The 
configuration of actors are pulling resources in the same direction rather than constituting a 
mechanism of balance and check. The resultant outcome is an economic system with a high 
degree of centralized control and an asymmetrical distribution of power between sectors.  
 
New Public Management reforms 
 
The ‘autonomy and de-coupled’ perspective on the state can help explaining the inconsistent 
and contradictory nature of the Norwegian reform movement. The overarching goal of 
managing oil incomes has implication on reforms and policy-making across a wide set of 
                                                 
7 For example, when unemployment increased in the early 1990s, wage moderation was the most important 
weapon for counteracting the business cycle thus making employees taking on a large part of the responsibility 
for competitiveness. 
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policy areas. Due to political opposition reforms occur in bits and piecemeal. The movement 
of administrative reforms has been described as being the result of different forces and 
contingent events rather than a result of a general and comprehensive administrative policy 
derived from government’s modernization programmes. Moreover, Norway has been 
described as a laggard in adopting NPM reforms and the Norwegian approach has also been 
described as focussing more on the managerial component than on the marketization 
component. Inconsistency in reform principles has produced a number of layering implying 
that reforms are rather complementing previous administrative systems than supplanting 
them. Currently, the public administrative system is characterized as being highly varied, 
diverse, and fragmented, and having to manage a more complex task portfolio (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2008, Lægreid et al. 2006, Bleiklie et al. 2003).  
 
Various studies draw the same conclusion: the Norwegian governance system has become 
more centralized in spite of NPM inspired reforms aiming at increasing devolution, 
autonomy, and increased flexibility at local and regional levels. Under the guidance of 
management by objectives and results by introducing activity planning, budget and pay 
reforms, local government was to become more efficient and ease governmental tasks in an 
expanded state activity by undertaking different roles and by giving effective responses for 
local action. Different types of intervention, occasionally referred to as post-NPM reforms, 
have counteracted processes of devolution. One is the concern for assuring equal and uniform 
provision of public social services across the country. Another concern is the fear of rivalling 
interests inherent in the governmental sector principle. New tools and mechanisms such as 
standardization requirements, targeted allocation of resources, and different audit and 
assessment measures have over time been introduced to compensate for loss of direct sector 
control at the local level (Fimreite et al. 2004).  
 
Allegedly, as a result of ‘post-NPM’ reforms Norway has developed greater central 
supervision and lower local empowerment than the other Nordic countries (Sellers and 
Lidström 2007:622). Local government in Norway has become more state dependent, a 
development trend that represents a break with the tradition of local government. The 
municipality act of 1837 secured a relatively strong local government. During the reform 
movement it appears as the central administration has lost trust in municipalities’ capacity for 
carrying out governmental tasks. At the same time there is less belief in municipalities’ 
capability for managing the nation’s wealth. Recent studies also suggest that the state has 
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developed a strong belief in its own capacity for governing vis-à-vis the local level, and that 
the state has developed governance tools and resources for full control. Such an allegation 
might be justified since studies also evidence that NPM reforms have triggered power games 
between different social and professional groups at the local level. Increased 
professionalization of local administration and unwillingness to take on new roles has 
released tugs-of-war, tension and conflicts, and reduced local power for problem solving and 
carrying out tasks. Central actor groups agree that the oil wealth is a driver in centralization 
(Fimreite et al. 2004:106-7, Lægreid and Christensen 2008).  
 
At the same time as the political and administrative governance system has become more 
centralized, it has also become more complex and fragmented. This sort of inconsistency has 
weakened the capacity for problem solving. But occasionally devolution has open up new 
social spaces which has produced new configuration of actor groups with a problem solving 
orientation. An illustrative example is the oil sector where a neo-corporatist configuration of 
actor groups jointly opened up for experimentalist operations.  
 
The Case of the Offshore Sector 
 
Around 1990 the government changed its oil policy: the Norwegian shelf was to be opened 
for free competition. The national oil company was to be freed from socio-political 
objectives such as securing regional development. Statoil, the state owned company, was to 
be operated purely on the basis of profit criteria. At the same time the decision was made to 
internationalize operations. There were a set of different external and internal factors that 
trigger the shift in policies: the oil price shock, less activity on the Norwegian shelf, lack of 
new discoveries, and Norway’s negotiations for EU membership. Thus, the oil sector was to 
be liberated from the political system and instead to be ‘governed by the market’.   
 
Over the years operations on the Norwegian shelf had become increasingly marked by heavy 
bureaucratic routines, organizational ineffectiveness, expensive and rigid technological 
solutions. Statoil’s administrative and organizational procedures constituted an emulation of 
the practices of the state administration. This is marked by a sharp division of labour (Olsen 
1989:112-13), and bureaucratic procedures applied proved to be particularly costly when used 
for development projects. Statoil provided the specifications of assigned projects. To control 
suppliers and to secure transfer of knowledge a system of dual management – in the shape of 
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‘shadow organizations’ - was established, since various suppliers had to build their own 
administration. For a middle-sized project the flow of documents could amount to 30 to 40 
000 only in the engineering phase. It is estimated that costs linked to administration and 
organizational routines were about three times higher than in the Mexico Gulf (Lerøen 2002, 
Ryggvik 2000:263).  
 
Improving profits also implied a change of technology. The style applied on the Norwegian 
shelf was characterized by large concrete platforms that over time had assumed monstrous 
proportions. They were constructed to master extreme weather conditions in the North Sea. 
By the end of the 1980s the concrete platforms were becoming too expensive. They also 
proved to be less manageable in smaller oil fields that constituted an increasing part of the 
activities. But changing the technological style was as much an issue of changing mind-sets. 
Within the petroleum sector it was taken that ‘we were the best in the world’. ‘That we did it 
at a price that was 50 per cent too high or 100 per cent too high did not worry people …’ 
(Engen 2002:155).  
 
In rhetoric the market was to solve challenges facing the Norwegian oil sector. In reality 
political initiative was taken to remedy the situation. In 1991, the Minister of Oil and 
Energy launched a cooperative programme called NORSOK (The competitiveness of the 
Norwegian shelf). The aim of this coordinated action was to encourage search for technical 
and organizational solutions that could attain acceptance by all relevant groups, and to 
develop interactive patterns that could induce efficient and mutually beneficial routines and 
procedures (Engen 2002:292, 302).  
 
An underlying idea of NORSOK was to render suppliers a more independent role. It was 
taken that a change in the contractual relationship between oil companies and suppliers would 
open up for greater risk sharing. Institutionalizing risk sharing would in turn create incentives 
for more efficient technological solutions. For the oil companies this meant that they would 
have to pay lower prices for commissioned products. For the suppliers it would involve the 
possibility of developing more efficient organizational procedures and cost reductions. Three 
main areas were targeted: 1) simplifying and standardizing procedures 2) reducing 
documentation and bureaucratic procedures, and 3) involving the suppliers earlier in the 
development projects. A more liberate contractual relation was to lead to a win-win situation 
for both parties (Engen 2002:182-3, 187).  
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NORSOK did not proceed as planned. Developing technical standards that everybody could 
agree on proved to be futile, among other things because it conflicted with emerging 
internationalization. Later reports also criticized the programme for having created a win-
loser situation for the supplier industry in the race-to-the-bottom initiated by oil companies. 
Reports maintained that suppliers had insufficient organizational capability and experience 
to be network entrepreneurs with the responsibility of maintaining national and regional 
competence. However, the situation following ‘the liberalization’ was less homogenous as 
depicted. Capacity suppliers for example, that produce standardised components and that 
possess few technical and organizational capabilities, were more negatively affected than 
system suppliers (Engen 2002).  
 
Over all, the NORSOK initiative failed to provide practical solutions such as technical 
standardization. But the coming together of various actor groups opened up for new 
solutions. These actor groups consisted of oil companies, supplier and services firms, 
industrial federations, employers’ and employees’ organizations, and Norwegian oil 
authorities, in fact a typical neo-corporatist arrangement. Within the framework of 
NORSOK, these formally organized groupings developed a more open culture to the extent 
that actors’ mind-set changed. Realizing that they had common interests, and that they were 
all part of a ‘we’, paved the way for a new kind of interaction between oil companies and 
suppliers.  
 
An outcome of new relational ties was a new contract form called EPI (Engineering, 
Procurement, Construction). This type of contract is characterized as efficient incentive 
contracts: open specifications open up for innovation. They are also known as relational 
contracts because they contain elements, so-called functional requirements, which are 
difficult to treat legally. For a third party it is difficult to assess an engineering service. Its 
nature is therefore seen to be self-enforcing, and reputational motivation an integral part. 
Mutual trust facilitates these kinds of contracts and partnerships, and they will consequently 
contain a high degree of ‘soft governance’. Another decisive outcome was a shared 
understanding that development projects should be delegated to only four large system 
suppliers instead of oil companies controlling and coordinating the activities of a large 
bundle of suppliers. The Norwegian shelf is supposed to be unique in this sort of 
decentralized coordination.  
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New contractual forms and new, decentralized ways of organizing and coordinating 
activities opened social spaces for entrepreneurial players. The following narrative gives 
one example of how a representative of the supplier industry made use of this institutional 
change in this contingent situation to co-create new rules of the game in the Norwegian oil 
sector.  
 
The player in question used to be a division of Kongsberg Weapon Factory, Kongsberg 
Offshore (KOS), specialized in systems and equipment to subsea operations. In the early 
1990s, then a subsidiary of a US based multinational, it was a comparatively small 
organization, employing less than 100 people. Due to its small size a problem arose when it 
was offered two projects simultaneously, one for Statoil and one for Shell. Typically, both oil 
companies required quite different technology for their subsea operations (KOS Annual 
Report 1991). KOS’ first thought was ‘we have to choose one of them’. The next was, ‘why 
don’t we develop a common technology base that both can use?’ KOS went for the latter 
option, and managed to persuade both companies to accept their technical solution without 
either of them knowing about the other. 
 
The option chosen had two important implications. First, KOS as a supplier took on full 
responsibility for designing the project. Secondly, their design involved a standardized 
solution based on a modular approach. Standardization was a controversial issue in the oil 
industry since oil companies’ identity and reputation was based on discrete technology. 
However, an accidental situation made Statoil change their mind about a standardized 
solution. On 23rd of August 1991 one of its platforms, Sleipner, disintegrated and sank. 
Statoil got a dilemma since they already had sold the gas from Sleipner. The need to solve 
the problem instantly was imperative. Normally it would have taken two years to replace the 
installations, two subsea templates. KOS delivered both within nine months after being 
assigned the job. ‘That gave Statoil a good taste of the advantages of standardization’ was 
the observation made (KOS Annual Report 1992). 
 
For the oil industry this sort of flexible specialization proved to be ideal for meeting new 
requirements in terms of cost reduction and flexibility in relation to variation in the nature of 
oil fields. Standardization or modularization allowed increased flexibility, reduced costs, and 
shorter installation and project cycle time. Standardization in subsea systems implies modules 
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that can be re-configured to suit every application in use on subsea oil fields. It also implies 
the redeployment of tools, technical, and management resources. The effects were visible 
right from the start. The learning curve of the dual project surpassed expectations. One of the 
offers the subsidiary submitted was estimated to cost around NOK 480 million. This figure 
was some 300 million lower than the second lowest offer. It was considered craziness. 
However, between 1991 and 1997 KOS managed to half costs twice. KOS’ stroke of genius 
can be described as tailorized solutions for standard prices. Generally, project-based 
operations tend to be idiosyncratic and cross-project learning consequently low (cf. Whitley 
2006). Modularization made it possible to capitalize on learning from one project to the next.  
 
The Sleipner project represented the start of a technology development that revolutionized 
the subsea business. Moreover, risk sharing between customer and supplier in solving 
increasingly complicated tasks lifted Norwegian offshore technology to the forefront. The 
cooperative mode that evolved allowed the Norwegian shelf to become a sort of 
experimental laboratory. Not least was experimentation sustained by the fact that customer-
supplier interaction was extended to also include to R&D projects. This kind of 
collaborative projects is in the offshore sector referred to as framework contracts. It started 
with the introduction of the first Technology Development Agreement between KOS and 
Statoil in 1994. A year later Mobil, Elf, and Shell joined the agreement. The aim of such 
joint projects is not to produce a specific product or delivery, but to further develop 
inventions and technological solutions for perceived future challenges. In this respect, 
companies and suppliers have benefitted from interaction with the wider business and 
innovation system in Norway. The competitive aspect involved in the informal rule of using 
four different system suppliers in projects is considered to add extra dynamism in the sector.  
 
Changing relationship between customer and supplier has at the same time changed the power 
balance within the supply chain. System suppliers have taken over the driver’s seat as to the 
technological development. This role shift has several implications. Complex projects require 
knowledge and competence from a variety of internal and external sources at the same time as 
complexity has triggered the outsourcing of tasks and manufacturing operation. To the extent 
that cooperation takes place across organizational boundaries, more players have been drawn 
into experimentation and are benefitting from knowledge transfer and sharing within the 
supply chain.   
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Over the years several types of institutions have co-evolved with players within this sector: 
research funding (targeted research programmes within the Research Council of Norway), 
counselling, educational services, internationalization support (Intsok) and so forth. In 1999 
the temporary NORSOK organization was replaced by a permanent one. A forum consisting 
of representatives of oil companies, suppliers, the public research system, employers and 
employees, and Norwegian ministries and authorities presides over the new organization. The 
forum is headed by the Minister of Oil and Energy and has 37 participants.  
 
The result of this co-evolutionary process is that Norwegian players have become leaders in 
offshore technology. Three of the four largest subsea companies in the world are Norwegian 
or Norway based. For players that have become global the Norwegian shelf has served as a 
platform. In 2005 Norwegian players had a market share of 48 per cent in subsea systems 
(Quest Offshore Resources, Inc. Jan 2006). In the national economy the offshore sector has 
become the third largest export sector after petroleum products and metals. Between 2003 and 
2005 foreign sales accounted for 75 per cent of its growth, and from 2005 to 2008 foreign 
sales almost doubled. Depending on how the boundaries of this sector are defined, whether 
firms are entirely or partly offshore suppliers, the number of entities varies between 1500 and 
2800. It is a complex sector and it is not classified as a sector in its own right, key areas 
comprise seismic, reservoir analyses, drilling, well services, engineering, subsea installations 
etc. In several regions of southern Norway offshore has become an engine of growth. The so-
called subsea-corridor in the wider capital area of Oslo is even about to become a global hub 
within subsea technologies (Heum et al. 2006:12, Vatne 2007).  
 
An assumption one can draw from the offshore experience, is firms have to adapt to the 
experimental orientation for benefitting from the cooperative mode of operation. The case 
study of the Kongsberg companies is in this respect revealing about organizational changes 
within Norwegian business.   
 
 
4. Creating global competitiveness: the case of the Kongsberg companies  
 
The state owned company Kongsberg Weapon Factory (KV) was split and divested in 1987. 
Some of the successors are strong examples of Norwegian business that have achieved global 
visibility. In the Norwegian context they stand out as to integration with the global economy. 
 19
About 80 per cent of their production is exported and they have operations/or are owned by 
enterprises that operate globally. This state of affairs together with the fact that they have a 
relative peripheral location made them appropriate as case studies for the Translearn project. 
The following gives a presentation of five of the successor units and an account of how these 
units have reinvented themselves after the state divested the company. Information is based 
on interviews, annual reports, and different types of literature.8  
 
KV used to be a traditional manufacturing enterprise based on mechanical engineering, but 
through the postwar technology programme its business model changed. In the technology 
programme KV was designated to be a national locomotive for the development of high tech 
industries: to develop new civilian products based on new defence technology. For this reason 
KV evolved into a conglomerate of partly related and partly unrelated production lines. The 
technological capabilities underlying its diversification were accumulated skills in 
cybernetics, computing and electronics. The diverse production lines included: missiles; 
components for satellites; maritime steering systems; CNC tool machines; gas turbines; jet 
engine components; subsea systems; and components for the car industry to mention some of 
the most important products.   
 
Failure to produce profits for years concurrently with the change in the economic policy 
regime prompted the state to either sell or close down parts of the traditional state company, 
which had been established in 1814.9 However, the decision reached in 1987 was to split and 
sell KV into eight major and 14 minor separate units. Five of these have grown to become 
large by Norwegian standards and/or have achieved global visibility. The enterprises 
Kongsberg and Kongsberg Automotive have become multinational companies in their own 
right. The former subsea, gas turbine and jet engine component divisions are subsidiaries of 
foreign multinational companies. These are the USA based FMC Technologies, the USA 
based Dresser-Rand, and the Sweden based Volvo Aero respectively. These units are still co-
located in the small town of Kongsberg situated in the interior of southern Norway. But since 
they target different markets and customers, co-location implies that they only share a 
common geographic space. These firms do not constitute a local production system or cluster 
                                                 
8 The sketchy presentation of these units is far from providing justice to the richness of these stories.  
9 As a state owned company KV was highly irregularly governed. Whereas it formally was registered as a 
corporation with limited liability, in practice the board run it as a research and development institution. This 
inconsistency impacted on its commercial results. With the change in the economic governance regime, this state 
of affairs was found unsatisfactory. The employees fought hard to avoid the closure of units.  
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in the sense that they are cooperating in business activities. But it is a common feature that 
they have performed remarkably well after privatization.  
 
First and foremost their achievement is linked with their integration with the global economy. 
By tapping into global value and supply chains these units have been able to expand their 
business, to improve their position in value constellations and markets, and to increase returns 
substantially. For the five units in question the current situation10 is as follows:  Kongsberg 
employs about 4400 people, which is a doubling since its start in the late 1980s, and it has 
operations in some 25 countries. The concern targets the offshore, merchant marine and 
defence markets, and it is organized in two business areas, Kongsberg Maritime and 
Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace.11 In some niches within these markets Kongsberg is 
global leader.  Among its customers are leading organizations and institutions world-wide 
such as the US Armed Forces, NATO, and the European Space Agency and the Ariane 
project. It has had a long-term partnership with world-class companies such as Raytheon and 
Lockheed Martin in the United States, Aerospatiale and Thomson in France, and Hyundai in 
South Korea. The company has earned a good reputation, and has, for example, been named 
Raytheon’s Four Star Quality Supplier and the Australian Defence best supplier ever (Annual 
Reports). 
 
The second multinational company, Kongsberg Automotive (KA), has more than 50 facilities 
in 20 countries and over 11 000 employees.12 The company presents itself as a global 
provider of systems solutions to vehicle makers world-wide.13 When the new company was 
incorporated in 1987 it started with 315 employees mainly producing components for Volvo. 
At the time of incorporation its goal was to become world leader within its market segment. 
After completing a major acquisition in early 2008, KA became part of the top 100 
automotive suppliers in the world. For some time it has been a market leader within some of 
                                                 
10 That is before the financial crisis broke out.  
11 1.1.2009 Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace was split into two units: Kongsberg Defence and Kongsberg 
Protector System. 
12  The acquisition of the US-based Global Motion Systems (GMS), a diversified industrial company listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange, was completed at the beginning 2008. As a result of this acquisition KA has 
made its most significant expansion. GMS has a global presence with about 8000 employees working in 16 
production facilities in North and South America, 13 factories in Europe and 5 factories in Asia, and is a long-
term supplier to blue chip customers like Mercedes Benz, Toyota, Ford, GM, Renault, Peugeot, Lear 
Corporation, Caterpillar and Scania.  
13 A more detailed description is a global provider of engineering, design and manufacturing for seat comfort, 
driver and motion control systems, fluid assemblies, and industrial driver interface products 
(www.kongsbergautomotive.no)  
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its core areas, gear and clutch actuation. It is a supplier to all the major car makers world-
wide, and has been able to cope with constantly decreasing costs in the automotive industry at 
the same time as it has managed to increase returns (Annual Reports).  
 
KV’s former subsea division (KOS) is today owned by the US-based FMC Technologies. In 
total, FMC Technologies employs approximately 13 000 people and operates 33 
manufacturing facilities in 19 countries. KOS makes up the largest part of its business area 
Energy Systems and Services which accounts for about ¾ of FMC’s total revenues.14 Today 
FMC is the world leading supplier of subsea systems to the oil and gas industry with a market 
share of 40 per cent. FMC has met the expectations of the finance markets. In the five years 
period since incorporation in 2001 the company doubled its total turnover, and in 2006 its 
return on investment was some 20 per cent. Since 2000/01 the energy business and in 
particular the subsea part, which is largely operated from Norway, has been the main driver of 
growth of the entire MNC. In this development KOS has played a key role. Fortune Magazine 
has named FMC three times (2005, 2006, 2008) America’s most admired oil and gas 
equipment and service company ahead of renown companies like Schlumberger and Smith 
International. The evaluations are based on factors like innovation, management, and financial 
strength (Annual Report 2007, www.dn.no 17.3.2008).  
  
The former gas turbine division belongs to the US based multinational company Dresser-
Rand. Dresser-Rand is one of the largest suppliers of rotating equipment solutions to the 
energy industry in the world. The former gas turbine division employs about 100 people on a 
permanent basis, manufacturing is outsourced, but this unit has an annual turnover of more 
than one billion NOK (Annual Reports). Its gas turbines packages are delivered world-wide 
and after internal competition the Kongsberg division is the only unit within the multinational 
company that are delivering gas turbine packages. The Kongsberg unit proved not only to be 
more cost efficient than the English, French and American units within Dresser-Rand, but it 
had also developed a better industrial concept based on a systemic approach. Although the 
North Sea has constituted an important market, in which the Kongsberg unit is the dominant 
supplier of gas turbine packages, it has delivered and is increasingly delivering packages 
world-wide (Annual Reports, interview evidence).   
 
                                                 
14 The other two business areas comprise Foodtech and Airport Systems 
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The Jet Engine Component Division (JET) is an independent company jointly owned by the 
Sweden-based Volvo Aero Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of AB Volvo, and the 
US-based Pratt & Whitney and it is named Volvo Aero Norway (VAN). VAN was started on 
the basis of offset work within the framework of the F-16 programme in 1976 and employs 
about 400 people. Due to the nature of business virtually all of its production is exported. 
Within this sector competitiveness is highly reputational and based on technological 
excellence. Within shaft design VAN has achieved world class reputation.  Internationally it 
is known as a proven supplier for both military and commercial players, and is the main 
supplier of turbine shafts for Pratt & Whitney and General Electrics (Company accounts, 
interview evidence, US Department of Defense 2003).  
 
Internationalization 
 
For all these business units internationalization has been a pro-active strategy for benefitting 
from new opportunities. After a consolidation period the intensity of internationalization has 
increased markedly in the past 10 years: from being the state’s technology developer they 
have reinvented themselves to becoming global players. However, their way of 
internationalization varies.  
 
Today Kongsberg has operations in more than 20 countries. Access to markets and following-
the-customer orientation has been an important driver in its foreign direct investments (FDI) 
implying that most of these facilities are to support local marketing and service activities. The 
customer orientation has largely determined the geographical distribution of FDI, and main 
operations abroad are located in the UK (oil and gas), South Korea, Singapore, and China 
(maritime), the United States, and Canada (defence and maritime). Assembly departments are 
established in China, India, South-Korea, and Singapore. But also local conditions have 
impacted on the mode of internationalization. For example, nationalistic industrial policies in 
countries like South Korea and China prompted Kongsberg to enter on joint ventures with 
local partners. In 1999 Kongsberg together with Hyundai Information Technology founded 
Hyundai Kongsberg Maritime (HMK) in South Korea, the leading country in ship-building. In 
2003 HKM merged with a South-Korean service company and the name was shifted to 
Kongsberg Maritime Korea (KMK). Its goal of becoming the preferred supplier of maritime 
electronics in South Korea has been reached. KMK is by far the largest supplier of maritime 
automation. Currently it has a market share of about 50 per cent. Representatives of 
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Kongsberg point to the company’s reputation for explaining its achievement. The company is 
known for delivering and for being highly reliable. The same strategy is pursued in China and 
Singapore. In China, Kongsberg has established a new company, Kongsberg Maritime China, 
together with a local player, Hoi Tung Marine Equipment. Also in these countries the aim is 
to become the preferred local supplier (Annual Report 2003 and 2004). More recently, the 
search for complementary knowledge and competence has impacted on FDI strategies. The 
acquisition of Gallium in Canada and GlobalSim in the USA are cases in point (Annual 
Report 2006). Kongsberg has only a few manufacturing facilities outside Norway. These are 
located in Scotland, Canada, and the USA close to customers. But due to recruitment 
problems Kongsberg’s international activities have been stepped up. To ease recruitment 
Kongsberg has established engineering companies in Poland and India, and extended service 
operations in St. Petersburg, Singapore, China and South Korea to also include engineering.  
 
For KA it was clear early on that growth had to take place abroad. Internationalization is 
perceived as a strategy for securing and improving its market position. As a start this 
concerned particularly the position KA had achieved with clutch and gear actuation. 
Acquisitions abroad were judged imperative to consolidate its position. However, this strategy 
has been guided by a meticulous assessment of appropriate acquisition targets. It took almost 
ten years before KA made its first acquisitions abroad. In 1996 KA acquired two companies 
in Sweden and one in England to strengthen the market position of its core products. These 
acquisitions also involved a new production line, seat comfort. But instead of selling this line, 
KA further developed it to the extent that the company has a strong position globally also 
within this market niche. The following year it acquired a company in the USA. By 2000 the 
company was a world leader in clutch actuation. But realizing that customers’ requirements 
and expectations were constantly changing, KA saw the need of global presence, and picked 
up on a follow-the-customer strategy. From 1999 it has pursued an aggressive 
internationalization strategy by establishing new production facilities in Mexico, Poland, and 
South Korea. Further FDI include activities in China, the acquisition of a factory in Norway 
and another one in England. In addition sales offices have been established in Germany and 
France. But being part of the highly competitive automotive component market means that 
cost pressure is increasingly influencing localization issues. As a representative of company 
phrased it: ‘the rule of thumb is set by the cost structure’. ‘If wage costs surpass 10 per cent of 
the sales price, off-shoring is considered.’ 
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The fact that KA is a commercial success has facilitated the financing of its expansion. From 
2001 to 2005 its EBITA increased from 5 to 12 per cent. KA’s long-term relation with a 
Norway based Private Equity fund, which ended in 2008, has been instrumental for its 
growth. Early 2008 a preliminary peak in its globalization strategies was attained when KA 
could conclude the buy of the automotive activities, named Global Motion Systems (GMS), 
of the US based Teleflex. GMS had been on KA’s target list for ten years. GMS was more 
than twice a large as KA in terms of production facilities and three times as large as to the 
number of employees. An exceptionally strong industrial fit between KA and GSM was the 
reason given. The two units complement each other in terms of product platforms and 
customer base, i. e. gear shift, seat comfort and fluid systems.  
 
Like KA, KOS early on developed a vision of becoming a global player15, but it chose a 
different internationalization strategy. Rather than constituting itself as an independent unit, 
the division preferred to achieve this goal by becoming part of a multinational company. 
Facing the situation of getting new owners, both management and employees engaged 
themselves actively in finding one. The US-based FMC, head-quartered in Houston, was 
preferred since it had complementary technologies and product portfolios. Jointly FMC and 
KOS would be able to deliver total subsea system solutions. As important was the fact that the 
American company possessed a global marketing organization that KOS needed in order to 
become a global player. However, during contract preparations it turned out that the head 
quarter wanted to restrict KOS’ market access to the North Sea. This was in direct opposite 
with KOS’ aspiration of becoming a global player. The clash over KOS’ mandate took place 
at several levels, and was spearheaded by the employees’ representatives. The Kongsberg 
people won through, and the head quarter accepted that subsea engineering and production 
should take place in Norway and that the subsidiary should keep its intellectual property 
rights, expertise and patents. KOS was given the responsibility for supplying subsea systems 
world-wide apart from North America, which was awarded to the mother company. 
Moreover, the head quarter made the obligation to develop KOS internationally: its marketing 
organization should assist the subsidiary in internationalization. Lastly, KOS was 
denominated a Centre of Excellence (Dahling and Erlandsen 1999).  
 
                                                 
15 After successfully finishing a breakthrough project in the North Sea in the mid-1980s, the employees then 
knew ‘what they would be when growing up: a leading subsea supplier globally’. ‘What was dim was then 
clarified’. 
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Why KOS won trough must be understood in terms of a reflexive learning process. FMC used 
to be a traditional manufacturing company. In its inherent logic assets were tangible. By 
visiting Kongsberg the head quarter’s executive officers had the opportunity to observe a 
different world and a different logic. Instead of tools they saw that ‘the main value went out 
of the door at four o’clock in the afternoon’. As the representative of the parent company 
expressed it ‘KOS has helped us to see the big picture in subsea systems, with the emphasis 
on systems’. In the make-over process from a low-tech product-oriented enterprise to a high-
tech systems supplier the head quarter recognized the fact that knowledge and competences 
are locally embedded and accepted the decentralization of technological excellence. Like 
Kongsberg other local sites were given the status of Centre of Excellence (Dahling and 
Erlandsen 1999). Recently the local manager was appointed senior vice president of the 
parent company, and most recently strategic responsibility for the subsea systems area for the 
eastern hemisphere was transferred to its Kongsberg premises.   
 
The internationalization of the gas turbine division took place in a similar way as KOS, but 
pre-dates the privatization of KV in 1987. Lacking both competence and resources to develop 
a global marketing organization for gas turbines, which was considered too costly for only 
one production line, KV started actively looking for a partner in order to penetrate the US 
market. Dresser Industries expressed interests and purchased first 50 per cent of KV’s shares 
in the Division in 1985. Dresser for its part wanted access to the North Sea oil and gas market. 
The remaining shares were purchased after KV was split in 1987. The organizational 
resources Dresser provided thus enabled the marketing of the Kongsberg gas turbine 
internationally. Since Dresser produced gas turbines of different sizes than Kongsberg, the 
company had the advantage of providing a wide range of products within this market 
segment. Dresser merged with Ingersoll Rand in 1987 and with the new name Dresser-Rand 
Company it was listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 1990.  
 
VAN, which started on the basis of offset work within the framework of the F-16 programme, 
got a head start access as a component producer to the most exclusive part of the jet engine 
market. VAN made use of this opportunity by persuading Pratt and Whitney to adapt to 
VAN’s production system solution as to shafts, vanes, and cases. By targeting the civilian 
market it was able to further develop expand business. Since the design of jet engines are 
extremely costly and technologically extremely demanding, development processes take place 
as a partnerships between jet engine manufacturers and component suppliers. Due to world 
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class reputation VAN has managed to conclude development contracts and deliveries to the 
foremost customers in this market. These connections have been crucial for this unit’s 
existence since Norwegian authorities have failed to share risks in its technological 
development. Although risk sharing between customer and supplier is fundamental, the 
supplier’s competitiveness is based on technological excellence in strategic areas. Today 
deliveries to the civilian market make up about 80 per cent of its sales. 
 
Customer Orientation 
 
The five Kongsberg units have pursued different modes of internationalization, but they share 
one common strategy: a strong customer orientation.  In a recent survey enterprises at 
Kongsberg indicate that foreign customers constitute the most important group with whom 
they cooperate in innovative activities (Oxford Research 2006). They also indicated that this 
kind of relations had resulted in increased sales of products and services, and enabled them to 
enter new markets and gain new customers. This approach is consciously cultivated. 
Kongsberg maintains that it cooperates with customers more than most firms in their business 
areas. KOS states that close relationships with customers constitutes a cornerstone in their 
business strategy and it assumes that it has been able for form more types of cooperative 
arrangements than any other player in its sector (FMC Annual Report 2004).16 KOS began 
working in integrated teams with customers in 1994.   
 
For the Kongsberg units a pro-active customer approach implies working closely together 
with the customer. Their orientation is experienced based and is found to be indispensable in 
improving competitiveness. Through assigned projects the workforce learned that knowledge 
sharing and exchange in team was instrumental for practical problem solving. Moreover, 
accumulated skills and knowledge in one project upgraded the organizational competence and 
prepared it for solving increasingly complex problems. The method developed implied new 
ways of involving the customer.  When assigned a project the people in charge may not have 
any idea of what the result is going to look like, but ‘technological solutions are found in the 
intimate cooperation with customers (Kongsberg Annual Report 2006). The point is to get an 
                                                 
16 This is how the business units present themselves: Dresser-Rand: Delivering systems and business practices 
that provide value to all participants (www.dresser-rand.com). VAN: To innovate customized partnership 
solutions and being the best partner. (www.volvo.com). Kongsberg: the best partner, the preferred supplier or the 
best alternative; FMC:  customers most valued supplier; KA: the best alternative for our customers; Dresser-
Rand: value for all participants.  
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in-depth understanding of the customer’s most critical needs. In their own words the 
Kongsberg people say that the first step is to get to know the customer as well as possible and 
at the end to have a deeper understanding of the customer’s situation than the customer itself.  
 
Cooperation with customers started way back in the KV period and has over time changed its 
nature. In the first stage it took place as licence production. In the 1950s KV started licence 
production for automotive components for the Swedish company Volvo that needed to expand 
its production capacity. KV’s experience of repetitive production facilitated the establishment 
of this sort of scale production. KA’s present leadership in clutch servo and hydraulic 
gearshift started as a licence production for Volvo in the 1970s. In the 1950s KV started 
production of air defence cannons for the Swedish Bofors company that introduced KV to 
number technique in manufacturing. Later on this competence formed the basis of KV’s 
development of computers.  
 
A next stage started around 1960 when KV was assigned a project that entailed the 
development of a ‘tailor-made system’ for the Norwegian Defence. The project, Terne, 
concerned an anti-submarine weapon system and KV was to develop and adapt the system for 
production and installation. Terne was a highly complex system and required the combination 
of knowledge from different disciplines that went far beyond in-house resources. Until that 
point of time KV had basically been a mechanical workshop. For transforming and upgrading 
activities KV started to recruit engineers from the USA and UK and to support relevant 
research projects. The Terne project impacted strongly on KV’s future role, identity and on 
the organization of work both internally and externally. It induced processes of cooperative 
interaction with customers, both also with other types of partners due to the need of 
complementary technology (interview evidence). Thus, from being instructed by customers 
what to do, KV changed its role to take on responsibility for developing customized products 
and services. 
 
To develop Terne, KV’s project team collaborated with research teams at key technological 
institutes in Norway such as Sintef and Christian Michelsen’s Institute in addition to the 
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). Two companies, Simrad, a small 
Norwegian company and an American one, both with expertise on subsea acoustics, were also 
engaged. In the production process the developers interacted with skilled workers thus 
pioneering a type of simultaneous engineering. Installation work was sub-contracted to 
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suppliers of sub-systems. Sub-systems were partly acquired abroad, from the USA, the UK 
and the Netherlands. Activities within the framework of NATO facilitated the search for 
complementary cutting-edge technology. The transnational community related to NATO 
provided Norwegian research and industrial communities with a good overview of where to 
find relevant expertise internationally. The NATO framework was also important for gaining 
new customers and markets and providing a search-network. For example large projects such 
as the F-16 necessitated interaction with about one hundred different US based companies. 
Equally important was the fact that this framework also made it possible to be connected with 
‘world class’ customers and partners. It became a rule of the game in the Kongsberg 
community of practice17 not to cooperate with the next best only the best (interview 
evidence). For example, through the Norwegian Defence KV was able to establish links with 
leading defence contractors in the USA like Hughes and Raytheon. These relationships have 
persisted for decades and have facilitated access to new customers and markets.   
 
The customer orientation has not taken place as a sequential process, but has over time been 
repeated from business area to business area. For example the subsea division started as a 
licence producer of well heads for Cameron Iron Works. Gradually this cooperation expanded 
to include first sales and in the next stage product development. On the basis of this 
cooperative interaction, the assignment of pre-projects and engineering tasks for oil 
companies the subsea division systematically assembled knowledge of subsea oil and gas 
production systems. This systematic search period lasted for about ten years. The work for 
Shell and Statoil in the North Sea in 1984-87represented a breakthrough for the division’s role 
as a system supplier, particularly the Gullfaks project. The project comprised the first 
diverless subsea solution that covered even unforeseen underwater difficulties. To solve the 
assigned project KV formed a joint venture with the UK based TRW Ferranti and the two 
companies established a subsidiary, Kongsberg Subsea Controls. Thus, through active 
interaction with customers and business partners KOS developed from being a licence 
producer to becoming a system supplier i. e. having the responsibility for designing and 
delivering subsea control systems.18  
 
                                                 
17 Community of practice refers to socio-cultural practices that emerge and evolve when people who have 
common goals interact as they strive towards those goals. 
18 Subsea systems comprise subsea wells for the production of oil (the extraction) and the further processing of 
it, including oil, gas and water separation. This takes place in so-called subsea trees and manifolds. The inner 
part of the physical outfit is filled with complicated electronic control systems.  
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By deliberately seeking more demanding customers, the Kongsberg units have been able to 
upgrade skills and knowledge. Today the customer approach is a strategy for continuous 
improvements and innovation.19 Products or systems produced are not restricted to the value 
of themselves, but products and services developed for one customer can be used in such a 
way ‘that (it) leads to innovations that are applicable throughout the industry’. This can be 
secured in the contractual agreement where the supplier retains the right to commercialize 
new technology against paying a royalty to the customer that has paid for the development 
(Kongsberg Annual Report 2005). In this way distinct projects form part of a long-term 
process of technological development in which competence is accumulated at the 
organizational level. Through close interaction with customers the Kongsberg units have been 
able to change their roles, identities and tasks. From being a licence producer they are today 
capable of solving problems ‘the customer does not know of himself, and to present the 
customer with a vision of future change’. Based on excellence in some core technologies the 
units can deliver a wide set of customized products and services. The flexibility linked with 
this type of production system has proven capable of taking advantage of new possibilities – 
‘to be prepared for the unknown’.  
  
System Suppliers 
 
To a large extent the Kongsberg units also share the same business model: the supply of 
integrated systems. The system approach implies creating unique products by combining 
different knowledge and providing services related to unique products. The understanding of 
systems originates in KV’s work on developing weapon steering systems, but the system 
template also evolved from practice. For example, KOS lost an important contract due to 
opposing interests and strained relations with a partner. This experience taught employees a 
lesson about the importance of owning and controlling the technology. In their own words 
they started methodically to amassing knowledge about ‘how things work’, product group 
after product group. In this perspective system engineering is also a method for reducing risks 
in inter-firm relationships that are becoming increasingly fluid in global supply chains. Being 
                                                 
19 Co-creating products and services with customers can be fraught with challenges and a central theme in 
collaborative activities is ambiguity and their provisional nature (cf. Sabel et al. 2000). Collaboration can be 
hampered by struggles for influence, provisions relating to property games. Large companies might pass on 
innovation costs to their suppliers, but firms may also appropriate innovative concepts or product ideas. One 
solution found among the Kongsberg units is to secure further use in the contractual agreement. The supplier can 
retain the right to commercialize new technology against paying a royalty to the customer that has paid for the 
development (Kongsberg Annual Report 2005). 
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able to control the design and construction of integrated systems has reduced uncertainty in 
the relationship with customers and partners. In highly costly projects such as the production 
of subsea projects, or gas turbine packages, costs may amount to billions. The Kongsberg 
units themselves maintain that system engineering has been instrumental for reducing risk 
substantially in innovation.   
 
Yet, system engineering does not preclude fluidity in the division of labour in inter-firm 
relationships. In searching for new opportunities and for reducing costs, the Kongsberg 
players are continuously changing their business concept. As the CEO of Kongsberg phrased 
it ‘the more complex packages we can deliver, the more our share of value added will 
increase’. ‘It was a truism in the 90s that it paid to move as high up in the value chain as 
possible. But since ‘everybody’ now is engaged in system integration the margins have fallen, 
and we are instead focusing on ‘in-sourcing’, i.e. creating products with high competence.’ 
KA is also emphasizing in-sourcing in describing the nature of their system solutions, and 
pointing to the general trend from producing components to designing and manufacturing 
systems. Changing points of reference are prompting the adaptation and re-composition of 
relational interaction whether to be collaborative, arms-length, in-house activities or the 
subcontracting of volume of standard components. However, there seems to be a general 
trend that intensified collaboration in global value chains increases the need of in-house R&D 
activities.  
 
Investments in R&D  
 
All the Kongsberg units invest above the national average in R&D. Moreover, survey data 
indicate that in-house sources of ideas are almost as important as ideas from customers 
(Oxford Research 2006). On top is VAN that has invested some 20 per cent of its turnover in 
recent years. This high share reflects the buy of partnerships shares in the development of jet 
engines. Kongsberg invests about 10 per cent operating revenues for the development of new 
products. This amount is considered necessary for sustaining a sufficient, modern and cost 
effective product portfolio (Annual Report 2006). For KA long-term in-house development is 
considered a vital part of its business strategy. In-house product development has been a key 
strategy for accessing new customers and markets and for meeting customers’ changing 
demands. By systematically developing unique products the company has been able to 
produce products, as they say, that ‘impress our customers through innovative solutions that 
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create customer value’. Today 90 per cent of what the company is manufacturing are own 
products. One such unique product is the use of a highly flexible hydraulic technology in gear 
change systems. KA is the only supplier of this system in the world. Typically, investment in 
in-house R&D is mainly done by the business units themselves. Public R&D makes up only a 
minor part of the R&D work carried out. However, the public research system has been of 
importance for the supply of competent workforce and research institutes as partners in 
commissioned projects.  
 
External Partners      
 
Collaboration with R&D institutions dates back to the seminal Terne project. The Norwegian 
Defence Research Establishment (FFI) designed the Terne prototype in the late 1950s. 
Particularly FFI has been important for KV and its successor companies, but early on other 
research institutions such as Sintef and Norway’s Institute of Technology (today Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology) were also of importance for the transfer of 
technological knowledge. Cooperation and knowledge sharing between KV and these 
institutions have been crucial for technological achievements. For example, in 1967 KV was 
among the first companies in the world to launch a CNC tool machine for the mechanical 
workshop industry. Successively, KV’s core competence in control systems has been adapted 
to several markets and customers: in navigation, in systems for dynamic positioning; and in 
maritime control systems and so forth. Based on the same core competence KV managed to 
develop a gas turbine, which later enabled KV to produce components to jet engines 
components for the F-16 programme. The CNC tool machine project was linked to a large 
technology programme, the Numerical Control System Project, that involved the most 
important technology and science communities in Norway (Sødahl og Brataas 2005). Thus, 
despite the dismantling of the technology programme in the 1980s these network contacts 
have been maintained. For example VAN states that its cooperation with Norway’s Institute 
of Technology and Sintef has been crucial for the development of the jet engine components.  
 
Cooperative R&D activities have not taken place exclusively with research institutions. In 
fact, a substantial part of R&D work is carried out as partnership projects with customers and 
other business partners. As indicated above, on the Norwegian shelf the pro-active interaction 
with customers was expanded to also include development projects. This form of cooperation 
was institutionalized as framework contracts, an institutional arrangement and risk sharing 
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system that has helped Norwegian offshore technology to its current leadership. It started with 
the introduction of the first Technology Development Agreement between KOS and Statoil in 
1994. A year later Mobil, Elf, and Shell joined the agreement. In 1996 Dresser-Rand 
concluded a framework contract with Statoil. The aim of such joint projects is to further 
develop inventions and technological solutions for perceived future challenges. Much of 
Kongsberg development work occurs in this form, and roughly about a half of investments is 
customer-funded. One example is the development of the autonomous underwater vehicle 
Hugin. This started as a collaborative project with the Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment (FFI), Norwegian Underwater Intervention, and Statoil in 1995. The project 
represented a continuation of a small underwater vehicle developed in the mid-eighties. 
Today the Hugin concept is a leader within this market niche (Kongsberg Annual Reports).  
 
Over time KV’s number of collaborative partners increased and comprised a growing number 
of partners abroad. For example the cooperation with Germany and Siemens in the mid-1970s 
introduced KV to the micro-processing technology which resulted in the Supervisory Control 
System. Foreign collaboration included also the funding of projects. The jet engine division 
benefitted greatly from two US Air Force funded projects in the late 1970s: ICAMIC 
(Integrated Computer Aided Machining in Cells), and RAMIGO (Robotics and Measurement 
in Grinding Operations). Both projects targeted work practices and organization in the 
manufacturing of components. Today the Kongsberg units cooperate with research 
institutions world wide; they form part of transnational consortia participating in the EU’s 
research programmes; Kongsberg has established a centre of expertise in software in Bulgaria 
and is about to establish a similar one in India. 
 
The American connection has been crucial for the development of the defence business, but it 
has been helpful also for accessing civilian markets. 1979 the Norwegian Armed Forces (NF) 
commissioned Hughes Aircraft Corporations to develop the specifications for a new 
command and control weapon system. The implication of KV’s participation in this project 
was continuous cooperation with Hughes and other key contractors in the American defence 
industry like the Raytheon corporation with whom KV/Kongsberg have cooperated since 
1984. In 2005 this cooperation was renewed with the signing of a 10-years contract. Since 
Kongsberg itself is having insufficient marketing and sales resources these relations have 
been crucial for increasing its market shares and obtaining information about opportunities of 
changing markets and technologies. One recent opportunity, following 9-11, is to develop a 
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system of defence of civilian airports in the United States (Kongsberg Annual Report 2006). 
The fact that 25 per cent of Kongsberg’s export incomes derive from the US market indicate 
the importance of these relations (Kongsberg Annual Report 2005).  
 
Cooperative interaction is also taking place at the local level. Project-based operations imply 
the outsourcing of a number of activities, for example Kongsberg’s manufacturing workforce 
has been reduced by one half in the past decade, and standard products and components are 
increasingly sourced externally. Kongsberg is purchasing all sorts of different items and 
devices from more than 2000 local firms: machines, automation systems, computers, cables, 
software and so forth. But there is no definite answer to the ‘make-and-buy’ dilemma 
(Kongsberg Annual Report 2006), and most purchases occur as arms length type of 
transactions.  
 
Whether assignments involve collaborative interaction depends both on the type of delivery 
and the sub-supplier. Many supplier firms are small and medium-sized and spin-offs of 
former industrial enterprises, including Kongsberg itself. Some are willing and able to take 
part in processes of co-design, others are not. The nature of customer-supplier relations can be 
an issue of resources, but can also be an issue of small- and medium sized firms’ orientation. 
In general it is taken that sub-suppliers’ early stage participation in projects can have a 
positive impact on both quality and costs. But the fact that sub-suppliers lack relevant 
competence hampers the effectiveness of disintegrated supply chains. To some extent such 
bottle-necks are sought resolved in inter-firm relationships. VAN, for example, has provided 
both financial resources and competence to sub-suppliers (Fraas 1999). KOS has made some 
of their contract manufacturers partners to spur upgrading, and is encouraging sub-suppliers 
to take part in processes of co-design. KOS has about 185 qualified sub-suppliers in Norway. 
Examples of firms benefitting from close cooperation can be found. At least one of KOS’ 
partners has become system supplier and a global player in its own right. There are also 
examples indicating that local interaction can be highly beneficial for both partners. The idea 
for Kongsberg’s most recent success, Protector20, derived from a local partner, a small 
                                                 
20 Protector is a remote weapon station developed to protect troops in armoured personnel carriers. The idea 
developed by the small firm intrigued a couple of ’front-liners’ within the Kongsberg company. They got the 
CEO’s permission to try to sell it to the US Army. When they returned with the prospect of contracts worth 
billions, everybody was surprised. The idea was then further developed and in 2007 Kongsberg concluded a 
NOK 8 billion framework agreement with the US Army for the Protector. The weapon station proved to be 
highly advantageous in the US’ warfare in Iraq. The weapon station is now sold worldwide and the growth of 
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company specializing in defence equipment. The extent and quality of such inter-firm 
activities is unknown.   
 
Decentralization and flexible work organization 
 
The system of disintegration global supply chains rewards quick responses and the capability 
to adapt to varying situations. When explaining achievements, representatives of the 
Kongsberg units themselves point to organizational effectiveness: ‘we are quicker, more 
flexible, faster in making decisions, and we communicate fast in an informal way. It is the 
way we communicate’. Such statements reflect key managerial and organizational challenges 
in global supply chains: the capability of coordinating decentralized activities world-wide. 
The globalized economy’s exigencies of constant innovation and cost reduction, 
competitiveness depends utterly on co-workers’ creativity and dedication to solve problems.  
 
KV used to be a hierarchical industrial company, and all the successor units have a 
hierarchical organization, although a relatively flat one. Work practices and organizations 
have been and are subject to recurrent reforms and improvement. A common trend has been 
the decentralization of resources and responsibility, the team level constituting the most 
decentralized entity. Project operations imply that work is organized in teams, and the team 
level constitutes a key organizational principle: the interface between all sort of activities and 
levels internal as well as external. During the KV period multi-tasking operations made 
centralized decision-making ineffective, and teams and individuals were delegated a high 
degree of decision-making. Until recently, all the CEOs used to belong to the same 
community of practice linked with KV. This sensitized them to the importance of 
responsibility, openness and trust, and it appears as decentralization processes have been 
taken for granted as it is indispensable for creativity and problem solving.      
 
The composition and size of teams vary within and across firms depending on markets and 
tasks. In Kongsberg, KOS, and Dresser-Rand most operations are project-based and teams are 
continuously recomposed. In Kongsberg, KA and VAN, that are also running manufacturing 
facilities, teams are mainly divided either in production teams or development teams, but can 
also be formed ad hoc. The size of teams can vary depending on complexity and size, ranging 
                                                                                                                                                        
this product has prompted the division of the Defence and Aerospace business area. The small firm that 
developed the idea has become rich thanks to royalties.  
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from NOK 10 000 to one billion. In Kongsberg it is the task of the team manager to pick 
people with relevant expertise. This has been possible in a situation where ‘everybody knows 
everybody’. Kongsberg has a reputation for successfully combing teams, and management 
has dedicated attention and resources to secure their functioning. The company has initiated 
its own education in project organization. KA, on the other hand, tends to maintain teams on a 
more permanent basis. This is also the case with Dresser-Rand, but it has started 
experimenting with rotating people in order to provide employees with a better overview of 
the totality of tasks. This is taken to enable the organization with a more flexible use of its 
people.    
 
All the Kongsberg units are stressing the importance of collaboration within teams. In 
Kongsberg project work starts with team building in which people as a start get to know each 
other, and although the team manager has a key role, the principle of shared responsibility and 
collectivistic behaviour is considered fundamental. As a project co-worker put it: ‘we are 
supposed to enrich and upgrade one another and to pull one another forward’. In Dresser-
Rand it is stated that everybody is to participate, to give one another collegial support and pull 
together. ‘Together we achieve things, and there is very little of this is not my job.’ VAN is 
also pursuing a policy of involving everybody and refers to the ‘spirit of dugnad’ (teaming-
up) in teams. In KOS the sense of all-for-one and one-for-all is deliberately cherished. Teams 
are made collectively responsible for their work, meaning that nobody is hanged in case of 
failure.21  
 
The collectivistic orientation is understood as fundamental for processes of problem solving: 
the practice of knowledge sharing has formed an essential part in the development of 
technologies and new products. Knowledge sharing takes place both formally and informally. 
In 1997 Kongsberg established a new organizational principle: the decentralization of 
decision-making and functions. The different business units and product groups were given 
responsibility for various tasks. However, decentralization was given on one condition: the 
units were to allow ‘technology to flow freely’ (Hattestad 1998:42). Two factors have been 
                                                 
21 Norwegian workers discovered the advantages of risk sharing when encountering American work culture in 
the North Sea. ‘The Americans, and particularly the Texans, were obviously prisoners of their own system’. The 
personal consequences involved with failure in American corporations induced a behaviour that was basically 
preoccupied with protecting themselves and their jobs, in other words defending established practices. The 
resultant outcome was, in the eyes of the Norwegians, an archconservative approach to innovation. 
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crucial for the Kongsberg units’ capacity for knowledge sharing: experimenting in work 
organization and systematic training and education of employees. 
  
The Kongsberg units can draw on a protracted tradition in work organization experimenting. 
For example, production cells were pioneered in Norway in the jet engine division in the late 
1970s. New organizational principles were to improve efficiency. But as important were the 
norms and values that informally evolved within the community of practice. The implication 
of this culture together with project operations represented a break with a rigid understanding 
of roles and routines. Projects normally involved the cooperation across professional divides, 
across divisions and with extra-firm expertise. ‘At the time there were open doors throughout 
the whole company, so we could simply walk into any workshop and get a problem solved. 
The foreigners couldn’t believe their eyes’ (Dahling and Erlandsen 1999). Simultaneous 
engineering was practiced already in the Terne project in the early 1960s (interview 
evidence), and today operators and engineers are encourage to cooperate. All sorts of 
employee groups are invited to participate in improvement work and particularly in pilot 
projects. Most employees find such challenges rewarding and only a small minority prefer to 
stick to routine tasks. The principle of ‘broad participation’ has also been facilitated through 
formal organization changes by removing the social division of the work force. For example 
Kongsberg has institutionalized the same working hours and the same sort of employment 
contract all sorts of employees.    
 
Thus, a forceful factor underlying the Kongsberg units’ achievements is the set of informal 
norms and values that evolved within the community of practice linked with KV. This culture 
has been instrumental in several respects. A key principle has been/is ‘there isn’t anything 
was cannot solve’. Today representatives of this community will tell that ‘we solve anything 
from the seabed to the moon’. This sort of adventurous spirit – well embedded in the national 
tradition of explorers - has been cherished in KV’s managerial practice. Employees were 
pushed to develop new projects and business opportunities, and ‘people went to the task with 
a pioneering spirit and enthusiasm’. Management’s response to challenging projects and even 
‘wild’ ideas was ‘go ahead’. Given responsibility of projects provided employees’ with self-
confidence. In the words of one of the CEOs: ‘No one can become a world champion without 
feeling secure’. Such orientations helped creating a work organization that offered unique 
challenges and opportunities for talented young engineers world wide before the era of 
globalization. In the 1970s KV was the most internationalized company in Norway. The 
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resultant outcome of the community of practice that evolved was a work culture and 
organization that in itself is driving improvements and innovation. For the successor units’ 
achievement this legacy has been essential. A driver underlying employees’ effort is their 
pride in solving problems and working in a positive and encouraging atmosphere.   
 
Sustaining this type of work organization in an ‘everybody knows everybody’ situation is one 
thing. With increased interaction together with the creation of virtual work organizations 
world wide, the issue of team building and communicating has intensified. When most 
activities were co-located, the socialization of employees into the existing culture and work 
practices could function. Transmitting tacit knowledge and informal rules in spatially 
dispersed locations represent a different challenge. Typically, all the units are continuously 
experimenting with organizational principles and work methods to cope with exigencies of 
the globalized economy. Practices in project work are subject to alteration and new tools are 
introduced to improve efficiency and quality such as bench-marking and ‘best practice’. KA 
has over time been consistent in adopting lean principles such as Kanban, Kaizen Events, and 
Six Sigma. To ease information and interaction across divisional divides for increasing 
efficiency, different types of data systems are used, one being to increase the visibility of co-
workers knowledge and experience across the entire organization. To improve software 
development Kongsberg has introduced the Capability Maturity Model (CMM), the world 
most used tool for process improvements. Through the cooperation with Raytheon Kongsberg 
has been introduced to lean methods. In project work iterative development is employed 
which allow the teams in a pragmatic way to monitor and assess each phase of a project as 
well as its totality (Annual Reports, interviews). 
 
Kongsberg is also experimenting with creating improvements with ‘agile’ methods. This 
experimentation is linked to a national project, and is tested in Kongsberg Spacetec to 
improve software development. The method is based on employees working in 30-days cycles 
with 15 minutes project meeting every day, and a four-hour meeting every month that is also 
attended by the customer. The system allows swift responding to any changes ordered and to 
deliver accordingly rather than in accordance with contract specifications. This method is 
used in two pilot projects, one being the modernization of NASA’s ground stations, and the 
other an in-house product development project. The method increases the visibility of 
participants and facilitates communication. It focuses more on results rather than methods, 
and is based on individuals’ action and the interaction between them. Another important 
 38
dimension is the principle that change are normal and that participants can make changes into 
a useful process (Kongsberg Annul Report 2006).  
 
Education and Training  
 
To sustain a learning organization all the Kongsberg units are making considerable 
investments in the further training and education of employees. Education and training 
include all sort of employees in a ‘lifelong learning’ perspective. Constant role shifts require 
the upgrading of employees’ skills and knowledge, but internal training also represents an 
institutional arrangement for transmitting ‘the Kongsberg way’ of operating. Furthermore, in 
a highly competitive labour market at the national level, company level education is a strategy 
for retaining the work force. To a varying degree the units have been facing increased turn-
over. The units’ educational systems have over time evolved as responses to situational 
challenges.  
 
In 1998 Kongsberg established the Kongsberg School to manage all education and training 
activities. The School’s mission is to organize and coordinate training and educational courses 
for employees. All new employees receive at the start a six months training programme. 
Engineers are trained at Kongsberg whereas operators receive on-the-job training. The 
company has a programme for active searching management talents and run tailor-made 
management development programmes.  
 
KA introduced a trainee programme in 1994 targeted at tertiary educated engineers. This 
programme was institutionalized in such a way that all trainees receive two years’ education 
and training in all functional areas as well as international practice. In 1995 management 
started systematically to map all employees’ competence. At the same time they started 
compiling expertise requirements for different positions and comparing them with the 
employees’ profile. In case of disparities, these are rectified with training measures. 
Employees’ competence profile is also used for evaluating future need of competence. On the 
basis on such evaluations the company construct development programmes, which are partly 
obligatory partly facultative. Training is also linked with remuneration in order to encourage 
employees to develop their skills and creativity. This is a measurement to support KA’s belief 
in principles of delegation and personal responsibility. KA sets individual targets and 
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standards for all employees and in return provides support for employees to master their job 
and for reaching personal career goals.  
 
FMC/KOS is operating an Annual Performance Appraisal which is used both to evaluate and 
map the company’s competence and to develop career development plans for the employees. 
Employees are offered further education support and scholarship schemes. To promote 
competence upgrading the company is practicing job rotation, trainee schemes and 
buddy/mentor schemes. Dresser-Rand is also encouraging employees to use the firm’s fully 
paid tuition reimbursement programme for continuing formal education. It offers internal 
training provided by external experts as well as the attendance of professional development 
programmes world-wide.  
 
Typically, company level education systems have evolved unilaterally. This development 
pattern deviates from what is the case in the other Nordic countries and particularly in 
Denmark where local organizations and institutions jointly reform curricula and educational 
courses. To the extent that the units are using external providers, international providers 
appear to be favoured to Norwegian ones suggesting a gap between the public educational 
system in Norway and the needs of knowledge-intensive globalized companies. However, this 
gap appears to be valid for different types of professions. As KA puts it ‘knowledge acquired 
at school is considered to have a ‘shelf life’. It is indicative that VAN has to train operators 
themselves. As will be explicated below, there are some signs that this situation may change.  
 
The construction of social structures 
 
The Kongsberg units are integrated into different global value chains and processes of 
business renewal have taken place unilaterally. Yet, a pre-requisite for achieving global 
visibility from a peripheral location is the existence of decentralized social structures. The 
existence of social networks and a critical mass of firms have been crucial for creating a local 
labour market (cf. Casper 2008). Today more than 100 firms are co-located at Kongsberg. 
The educational level of the local labour market is unique. More than sixty per cent of 
employed people have an education above the bachelor level which is exceptionally high for a 
small town of approximately 23 000 inhabitants situated in the ‘middle of nowhere’. 
Kongsberg can not benefit from proximity to a university (Kongsberg Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry Project 2006). But the critical mass of firms provides a variation in job 
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opportunities that facilitates the recruitment of competent labour, at the same time as 
fluctuations in the need of labour can be offset between companies.  
 
The existence of social networks has an important function as to informal information sharing 
across firms. The inherited social ties from KV have been vital for the creation of social 
networks, and these ties have formed the basis for action taken to engineer social structures 
and orchestrate the development of the Technology Town. After KV was dismantled the 
different successor units co-created Kongsberg Chamber of Commerce and Industry. One of 
its first tasks was to support business activities internationally. Over the years this institution 
functions as a sort of organizational framework for joint action to solve common problems 
locally: to improve and extend social services and to improve the attractiveness of the town 
by supporting infrastructural and cultural arrangements. Understanding the needs of 
globalized businesses appears to be a challenge for players at the municipality level. Social 
services initiated within this framework are to support people working in globalized 
businesses: an international school for the children of foreign employees, a day-and-night 
kinder garden, and tailor-made programmes for expatriates and their families to make the 
transition to Norway as smooth as possible. The expatriate programme includes all sorts of 
practical counselling such as dual career support and language classes. Activities for 
developing the Technology Town also include initiatives for creating an attractive and 
innovative business environment in order to attract new firms and support start-ups. The 
Chamber of Commerce organize networking between large and small firms and provides 
cross-sectoral meeting place, organize annual conferences, courses and study trips.   
 
Recently, the major Kongsberg units together with the Chamber of Commerce and the local 
college were designated one of six National Centres of Expertise. Within the framework of 
this programme the units and the college has jointly developed a Master Programme in system 
engineering with the aim of developing it into a doctoral programme. To quality assure the 
education the local college is cooperating with Stevens Institute in the USA. The business 
units’ cooperation with the local college represents a new development trend. This action 
appears to be part of a trend taking place across the country. Until the late 1990s the 
recruitment of labour locally could be done without problems. Recruiting and retaining labour 
has become increasingly challenging, and has prompted various initiatives such as 
cooperating with and supporting activities within the public educational system. However, 
pro-active local or regional support of globalized businesses is hard to detect, and reforms in 
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the multilevel governance structure have partly impeded a shared understanding of the 
situation to the extent that potential public-private partnership projects have failed.  
 
 
5. Comparing Institutional Reforms in Norway with Reforms in the other Nordic 
Countries 
 
The account of the Kongsberg units indicates that business renewal is largely taking place 
without strong links to the economic governance regime apart from some activities linked 
with the extraction of oil in the North Sea. This suggests that public and private resources are 
not pulled in the same direction and that innovative firms in Norway to a lesser degree than 
innovative firms in the other Nordic countries can share risks with the public. The way 
research, education, and active labour market policies are managed and organized, supports 
such a view.  
 
The public research system  
 
When Sweden and Finland stepped up their investments in R&D in the 1990s, Norway’s 
research policy went in the opposite direction. Government even cut back investments in 
industrial R&D. As mentioned ‘the market’ was to govern economic development. This 
reorientation was the result of an ideological clash between neo-liberal inspired groups within 
the administrative and political elite and the group of ‘technologists’. The latter lost with the 
consequence that economic policies narrowed down. Despite recurrent policy statements of 
increasing investments in R&D, Norway’s investment rate is less than 1.7 per cent of GDP, 
the rate has remained low in spite of Norway’s unique financial situation.  
 
Low spending on R&D is often explained by low investments in the private sector. It is true 
that R&D spending in the private sector is lower than can by explained by Norway’s peculiar 
industrial structure (OECD 2008). In comparison with the other Nordic countries, the private 
sector’s share is low in Norway, it accounts for about half of total spending in contrast to for 
example the one in Finland that rose to more than 70 per cent already by the end of the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, it remains a fact that Norway spends less on total R & D per capita than the 
other Nordic countries although government spending is almost levelling the other Nordic 
countries in terms of amounts invested.  
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Moreover, both international and national reports point to low efficiency in the management 
of public R&D spending: too low coordination and too detailed control by the central 
administration. But OECD also criticizes the public research system for having developed 
symbiotic ties between the public research agencies and the large state owned companies, thus 
locking research into established trajectory. Moreover, recent reports conclude that less than 
half of money allocated through a governmental body went to innovation projects. OECD also 
finds that R&D carried out by the large companies is too less integrated into international 
networks (OECD 2008). In Norwegian research communities there is fear that key business 
players may off-shore research tasks, which also has happened.  
 
Norway also prioritizes her R&D investments differently than the other Nordic countries. 
Norway spends far more on university research, mainly social sciences, and on welfare 
research than on science and industrial research. Since the early 1990s the system of higher 
education has increased its share of public spending at the expense of industrial research 
(OECD 2007:129, Kallerud 2006:15). Yet, only exceptionally are Norwegian research 
communities ranked among excellent communities internationally. In a recent European 
scoreboard only biology at the University of Oslo obtained the status of excellence 
(www.che.de).  
 
As to prioritization the public research system in Norway plays a different role than in 
particular Finland and Sweden. In both these countries, research policies have made up an 
essential part of national innovation policies. Particularly in Finland was the research policy 
instrumental in transforming the economy in the 1990s.  
 
The educational system 
 
Norway’s prioritizing of education has made it one of the top spenders among the OECD-
countries. Norway invested 6.2 per cent of GDP in 2006 against the OECD average of 5.7 per 
cent (OECD 2007). Spending is particularly high as to primary and secondary education.22 
Although spending relatively less on tertiary education, Norway has a higher share of the 
                                                 
22 Particularly, primary and secondary education has been prioritized in Norwegian politics. It has been 
instrumental both in the processes of nation formation and in the process of constructing a social-democratic 
society. For this reason the Norwegian educational system has had a special focus on equalization, social 
solidarity, democracy, and personal development (Teige 2007:104).  
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population with tertiary education than almost all the other OECD-countries (Salvanes et al. 
2008:8). The public education system has provided the Norwegian economy with a workforce 
with a high level of basic education enabling people to navigate in a changing world. By 
international standards this highly educated workforce is also ‘cheap’, thus constituting a 
competitive advantage for knowledge-intensive enterprises. It is likely to argue that a highly 
qualified workforce is a driver in ongoing transformation of business in Norway. 
 
Nevertheless, there are reasons to question the appropriateness of the public educational 
system. An increasing number of studies indicate that the Norwegian education system is not 
as fit as has long been assumed. The PISA comparative studies have served as an eye opener 
as to primary and secondary education. The first study, published in 2002, showed that the 
achievements of Norwegian students were below average. The second PISA study showed 
that the performance of Norwegian students had even deteriorated since the first one. Nor has 
the education system fulfilled objectives as to social equalization as there still is a correlation 
between school performance and family background (www.udir.no/skoleporten).  
 
Thus, despite generous spending on education, and despite recurrent reforms to improve the 
system, only during the 1990s as much as three major reform programmes were implemented, 
Norway has failed to secure the quality of education of all social groups, just like many other 
western industrialized countries. An important challenge is an increasing number of drop-outs 
from the secondary level. Most of these are boys later found to receive disability benefits at a 
young age. Young people, and in particularly young men with low education, fail to be 
integrated into the labour market. Instead they are becoming members of an increasing group 
receiving social benefits. In 2001 this group numbered 700 000 and by 2006 it had grown to 
800 000 despite attempts to stop it from growing.23 The problem can also be related to the 
organizing of the vocational education and training system (VET).  
 
The Norwegian VET system is considered to have low efficiency. Vocational schools and 
apprenticeships were regulated by different sets of legislation until 1980, but as a general 
principle skill training used to be the employers’ responsibility. This state of affairs was 
                                                 
23 To secure a better coordination between health, social and labour market services in order to provide better 
and more ‘taylorized’ services for the people, the parliament decided in 2006 to merge the states bodies 
managing these activities. This major institutional reform is to be implemented within a three years period from 
2007 to 2009.  
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understood to make the system unstable, to be subject to market fluctuations and employers’ 
discretion.  Trade union officials claimed that skill training was for the few and not for the 
many: since employers decided who should receive skills training or not, ‘it was the face-
factor that counted’. For example, in 1953 only 30 workers in the metal industry were 
receiving formal vocational training. But despite the fact that workers got a legal right to 
vocational training in the 1950s, not many workers were formally educated at the level of 
VET in the succeeding decades. Still in the early 1990s the majority of Norwegian workers 
were not holding formal trade certificates. At that time it was stated that especially young 
people had difficulties in gaining appropriate education and training that was attractive at the 
labour market.  
 
In the early 1990s the VET system was radically reformed. Reform 94 was to transform VET 
from being a recruitment system to becoming an education system. The strategy was to forge 
tighter links between the apprenticeship system and upper secondary education. The structure 
was adapted to the new school system in which 16-19 years olds were given a statutory right 
to three years of upper secondary education. Although the number of apprenticeship contracts 
increased from less than 300 at the beginning of the 1970s to 13500 in 2007, an investigation 
of the system could not identify any positive link between Reform 94 and the growth in 
contracts. The current situation is that approximately 30 per cent of yearly cohorts complete 
an apprenticeship as a part of their upper secondary education. Moreover, only half enter into 
apprenticeship contracts at the normal age (Høst ed. 2008, OECD 2008). This situation forms 
a sharp contrast to the situation in Denmark where 60 per cent of young people between 17 
and 19 years of age are enrolled in VET programmes. 
 
Why Norway has failed to develop an efficient VET system is a complicated issue. But a 
comparison with the organization of the VET system in Denmark gives some clues as to the 
failure of the Norwegian system. In Denmark the trade unions have traditionally a strong 
voice in vocational in education and training. Representatives of employers and employees 
have majority seating on the boards of local secondary schools that provide vocational 
training programmes. In Norway the social partners were entrusted with a high level of 
authority for the administration and control of the system until 1980 when a new act 
transferred the responsibility of VET to the level of county municipalities. In 1990 the new 
Local Government Act released conflicts between the county municipality education 
administration and the VET administration. Subsequently, the secretariat for the national VET 
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board was formally integrated into the Ministry of Education in 1992. This transfer of 
authority has provided the state full control of VET. The argument for centralizing the VET 
system was the need for the educational authorities to evaluate more flexibly the ability of the 
trade structure to meet the labour market’s demands. Critics of the centralization link it to the 
hegemony of school interests in the Norwegian educational administration (Høst ed. 2008). 
Whatever the reason, it remains a fact that the VET system has become de-coupled from the 
labour market and real-time work practices. This de-coupling has made employers losing their 
interest in the public VET system. Instead the social partners prefer an experienced based 
Trade Certification as a system of certification.  
 
Active labour market policies 
 
Educational reforms affected the system of further education and training as well. As pointed 
to in the Introduction, Norway curtailed the proportion of occupational training in active 
labour market policies from 1990 onwards. In the other Nordic countries, particularly in 
Denmark, the opposite happened. As indicated in Table 1 in the Introduction, Norway still 
spends far less on vocational training and unemployment than the other Nordic countries. This 
outcome is yet an example of inconsistencies and paradoxes characterizing Norwegian 
policies.  Throughout the 1990s the Confederation of Trade Unions campaigned for Lifelong 
Learning. For almost a decade Lifelong Learning topped the political agenda. In 1999 a pact 
on further education and training, the Competence Reform Programme, between the state and 
the social partners was eventually achieved24. This pact secured employees a statuary right to 
further training. However, the funding of the reform remains unsolved. The money the 
government allocated was mostly spent on bureaucratic arrangement, and consequently the 
whole initiative disintegrated in the early 2000s25.  
 
The claim is made that Lifelong Learning only was used as an ‘exchange commodity’ for 
controlling wage formation. It is a fact that none of the tripartite members showed any 
genuine interest in developing the programme. It has been a strong point of view among the 
polity and the bureaucracy that further training and education is firms’ responsibility. But also 
                                                 
24 When the Competence Reform Programme was evaluated, it turned out that among the 80 000 employees that 
had participated, most of these had a tertiary education and was employed in the public sector (Døving et al. 
2006). 
25 This initiative earned Norway the reputation of being a frontrunner in educational policies, particularly in 
vocational education and training (Teige 2007, OECD 2002, 2000). 
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the Trade Union centrally failed to gain support for Lifelong Learning. One reason was that 
Lifelong Learning was not embedded among the rank and file. When asked, trade unions 
locally would rather have money than skill training. It is also claimed that the Trade Union 
centrally was afraid that workers should gain so much competence that they would migrate to 
other and rivalling unions. It remains a fact that none of the social partners were genuinely 
committed to an active labour market policy similar to ‘learnfare’ in Denmark beyond its 
symbolic significance (Teige 2007, Døving et al. 2006, Nyen and Skule 2005).  
 
Still, Norway scores high on international scoreboards of further education and training, 
particularly as to learning ‘on the job’. Employees’ participation rate is about the same level 
as in the other Nordic countries, but scores lower when the total population is counted. The 
reason for Norway’s high scores is that adult training and education is largely paid for by 
employers. In fact, Norwegian employers’ share of further training and education is the 
highest within the OECD area, but Denmark, Finland and the UK come close to the 
Norwegian level (Nyen and Skule 2005, OECD 2004).Typically, further training and 
education takes mostly place within companies, and rather than making use of public 
providers other companies, customers and suppliers constitute the most important external 
providers (Nyen and Skule 2005). When provided for by the public, training and educational 
activities are mostly restricted to employees with higher education in the public sector. This 
means that important social services are restricted to a small and privileged part of the labour 
market.  
 
Thus, in comparison with Denmark, Norway constitutes a direct opposite as to active labour 
market policies (ALMP). The role ALMP plays in sustaining dynamism in the Danish 
economy is informative as to the importance of a system of further education and training in 
the new economy.  
 
Emergent local initiatives 
 
There is an increasing criticism of the different parts of the public education system in 
Norway. As many other western industrialized countries the Norwegian education system has 
problems in recruiting students to science and technology. But this challenge is greater for 
Norway since its share of students in these areas is lower than in comparable countries. The 
relative low return to education, related to the system of central wage bargaining, is seen as a 
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challenge to develop and sustain a competitive knowledge economy. Another emergent issue 
is that students’ basic qualifications match badly the need of companies. Claims are made that 
too few Norwegian students graduate with qualities that are relevant to innovative methods in 
companies (Andersson et al. 2004:37). To a large extent the higher education system in 
Norway is structured to provide a workforce for the public sector. Sixty per cent of academics 
are employed in the public sector.  
 
Several sectors – engineering, ICT, biotech, pharmaceutical – have for a long time had 
problems in recruiting a qualified work force, and despite increasing unemployment, 
companies are struggling with recruiting people with adequate qualifications. Against this 
background several interest organizations are claiming the existence of a gap between the 
Norwegian educational system and the labour market’s need of basic competence. Recently, 
the Confederation of Norwegian enterprises identified the competence gap as the biggest 
future challenge. This challenge does not only affect basic education but involves also the 
upgrading of employees’ skills (NHO 2008)26.  
 
To recruit needed competent workers Norwegian companies are launching different strategies. 
One is to recruit workers abroad. 27 However, in certain labour markets, such as ICT, Norway 
does not appear to be an attractive location. Alternatively, some companies have established 
centre of expertise abroad and have tasks carried out in countries where workers come from 
such as Poland and India.  
 
A third strategy is to cooperate with a local education provider. For example to secure a 
competent work force, the Kongsberg companies have started a master programme in system 
engineering in cooperation with the regional college. The aim is to expand this master 
programme to also include a doctor programme. To assure the quality of the educational 
programme the local college is cooperating with Stevens Institute in the USA. Typically, until 
recently the Kongsberg companies considered the local education provider incapable of 
providing the students with a relevant and qualitative acceptable education. This sort of local 
interaction can increasingly be witnessed across the country. For example, in Rogaland local 
                                                 
26 This point of view represents a radical break in the strategic thinking of the Federation. Traditioanlly, cost 
cuts, mostly with reference to wages, has been considered the appropriate competitive strategy.  
27 To attract people to come to Norway some companies are offering extra money, and some companies have 
established own recruitment offices in India and some are actively calling on educational institutions to recruit 
students (TU 24/07, www.nrk.no 9.8.07).  
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interest groups – politicians, business, academics - have cooperated for a long time on a more 
general level in order to boost business and to create new jobs. The regional interest groups 
rallied around the objective of establishing a university in the region (Gammelsæter 2002).  
 
This sort of actions can be termed rebellion from the periphery. Local initiatives are seen as 
counter-action to central authorities’ failure to adapt key macro-institutions to exigencies of 
the globalized economy (Sellers and Lindstrøm 2007). Such initiatives can also be witnessed 
at the sectoral level. Within the maritime cluster several firms have joined forces with the 
intent of funding ten professorships within or related to maritime disciplines. This is the 
biggest private investment ever made in basic research.  
 
To sum up, this review of relevant social services supports the view that there is less risk 
sharing between the private and the public sector in Norway. In several areas there appears to 
be a mismatch between institutional resources and ongoing transformation internationally. 
One impediment for creating more experimental processes seems to be increased 
centralization in the system of governance. Within the framework of Norwegian authority 
pattern centralization can imply less capacity for cross-sectoral coordination and delegation. 
When this is the case, there is risk of developing lock-in situations.  
 
A silent revolution in routines complementing business renewal 
 
A contrary trend to centralization is found within the national system of industrial relations. 
As part of a broader movement within the Nordic countries, the trade unions have for a long 
time been engaged in workplace reforms. Within the broader movement it is taken that the 
decentralization of industrial relations and the emphasis on the articulation of local interests 
within the centralized structure of decision-making will impact on the advance of a new 
production concept. Increased reflexivity in working life is seen to have an internal 
restructuring effect. The ability to monitor one’s one work from the perspective of the 
competitiveness of the company or the business unit have generated a new concept of 
production, in which the workers themselves are supposed to be able to reflect the needs of 
the customer. In this new concept new roles and identities, new working careers and 
professional identities are seen to have the potential of creating new possibilities of 
development (Kettunen 1998).  
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In Norway the tripartite programmes that were initiated within the framework of this 
movement were designed to include areas of productivity and adaptability, and to encourage 
the participation of all sorts of employees. Recent programmes explicitly stressed the 
participatory principle for innovation: to make cooperation instrumental for development, 
change, and innovation (Gustavsen et al. 2001). However, the effect of these experimental 
programmes on organizational change in Norway has been unclear, whether new forms of 
work organization had disseminated beyond the number of firms involved or not. National 
and Nordic level studies carried out in the mid- and late 1990s indicated low effect, that 
Norway was even trailing the other Nordic countries as to organizational flexibility (NUTEK 
1999, Gustavsen et al. 2001). However, the last European Working Conditions Survey (2007) 
indicates that this state of affairs has changed (cf. Introduction). Norwegian employees, as the 
other Nordic ones, have the highest scores as to learning and work autonomy. These figures 
imply that Norwegian working life has been transformed in the past decade. This change 
process has occurred simultaneously with an intensified globalization. But paradoxically, this 
reform process has taken place with decreasing activity of trade unions locally particularly in 
knowledge-intensive companies.  
 
Yet, it is likely to argue that the trade union’s focus on broad participation – making 
cooperation instrumental for development, change and innovation - have facilitated new 
management templates and internalizing the interests of employees in how they are managed 
and organized when exposed to new challenges. The Trade Union centrally has a positive 
attitude to change and can in this way facilitate innovation at the firm level. This pertains 
particularly to the redefinition of work tasks in which representatives locally have a high 
degree of co-determination. The pro-innovation attitude counter-balances possible negative 
effects of employee co-determination. Instead of blocking change and the redefinition of 
tasks, trade unions can have a positive influence on firms’ capacity for innovation. For 
example when Terotech, a small engineering service company at Kongsberg, wanted to 
introduce an incentive based wage system this was accepted by the Union centrally. The 
incitement for changing the remuneration system stemmed from the firm’s changing role vis-
à-vis customers. Solving customers’ problems in interaction with customers themselves 
required new and different competences from employees beyond standardized routines and 
technical tasks. Moreover, problem solving for customers involved the participation of all 
employee groups. To further cooperation between groups – to transfer the shop floor 
collective to also include engineers – the company wanted to introduce one single tariff 
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system for all sorts of employee groups. This was accepted by the Union centrally. This 
orientation from the employees’ side has undoubtedly facilitated firms’ need for responsibility 
and functional flexibility.  
 
 
6. A Summary: Can Dynamic Complementarities replace Contradictory Institutional 
Orders? 
 
As a country to live in, Norway offers her population a good life: a high degree of social 
security and social services in terms of free education, maternity leave, child care, and high 
gender equality28. As to institutional adaptation to ongoing transformation in the international 
economy, Norway demonstrates less malleability. To a lesser degree than the other Nordic 
countries has Norway evolved a welfare state that enables localities, firms, and citizens to 
master the exigencies of the new economy.  
 
Yet, given the strength of the natural resource based economy, this study has revealed 
surprising ongoing dynamism in parts of the Norwegian economy. Norway’s economic 
success relates to skills in the refinement of natural resources. By refining core technologies, 
Norwegian companies and public research institutions have jointly developed increasingly 
efficient manufacturing processes and at the same time extended the supply of resources. 
Well-known examples are fish farming and increased exploitation of oil resources in the 
North Sea. More recently, new application of a traditional product has emerged: the 
refinement of silicium wafers for use in solar cells. To what extent this new industry will be 
devoted to explorative activities as well as exploitation remains to been seen. The remarkable 
growth this industry has experienced is politically induced, and future growth is uncertain 
since the industry is still struggling with unresolved problems as to commercial viability.1  
 
More surprising is the dynamism that marks the offshore sector. The emergence of an open 
and decentralized innovation system in which customers and subcontractors collaborate 
closely has turned the Norwegian shelf into an experimental laboratory. The concurrent 
restructuring of institutional arrangements – by turning lobby coalitions into a sort of 
communicative corporatist body – has facilitated transformation. Through joint efforts the 
                                                 
28 The statuary requirement of 40 per cent represenation of women in corporate boards led to Norway being 
ranked as number one (www.weforum.org).  
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offshore sector has redefined itself to the extent that it has become a global leader. The fact 
that growth has taken place mainly on international markets is clearly signalling that the 
sector has passed the ‘market test’. Leading players have reinvented themselves from being 
local suppliers to becoming global players.  
 
The emergence of this competitive sector is triggered by public policies’ concern of extending 
the supply of raw materials. An unexpected outcome is that a number of firms have changed 
from process optimization to experimenting and continuous adaptation. Peripheral players 
have been the frontrunners in the creation of this new pathway. Our case studies have 
disclosed that experimentation is not restricted to players within the offshore sector, but 
players within the automotive industry and jet engine component industry have demonstrated 
remarkable achievements. Across the country there are occasionally similar surprising 
outcomes. One example is the emergent biotech cluster in Oslo. In 2008 this cluster was 
denominated one of the twenty most emergent dynamic biotech clusters in the world, and the 
only one in Europe by the international journal Genome Technology. Given generally weak 
university-business links in Norway and biotech businesses’ dependence on academic 
research, this cluster represents a novelty in the national business system.  
 
These achievements are the resultant outcome of players’ capability of integrating into global 
value chains and constellations, and by their capability to construct social networks locally 
Network building locally and transnationally has compensated for lack of risk sharing 
arrangements at the national level, and it has helped avoiding narrow role definitions and 
strong functional boundaries characteristics typical of the traditional Norwegian business 
system. There was a weak tradition of inter-firm interaction let alone cross-sectoral 
interaction. Beside the horizontal collaboration that evolved in relation to the technology 
programme in the postwar period, a few exceptions like the maritime cluster in the north-
western part of the country, Møre (Andersen 1997), and the automation/robot cluster in the 
south-western part, Jæren, can be counted. 
  
A key issue is to what extent experimental businesses can sustain and expand without the help 
of public social services. The situation is for the time being that public policies are mainly 
geared towards sustaining a natural resource based economy and to balance activities and 
spending, not developing. Institutions are aligned to support ground rent seeking activities and 
process optimization. To a large extent there is a mismatch between institutional 
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arrangements and the exigencies of the globalized economy, let alone the fact that resources 
spent for social services in Norway rather push individuals into passivity than enabling them 
to master challenges. In fact, social services are creating social problems instead of solving 
them.  
 
For future competitiveness and welfare much depends on to what extent institutional change 
can co-evolve with the needs of and share risks with localities, firms and citizens. Local 
initiatives for bridging gaps in research and education are strong signals of needed reforms. 
But reforms need to be decentralized for the tailoring of policies to local needs: for 
stimulating and sustaining local dynamism. To give weight to an open and decentralized 
innovation system, incentives must include broad participation and stimulate cross-sectoral 
experimentation and collaboration. A flexible labour market is now considered to provide 
better conditions for experimenting than mere technology programmes, and although labour 
turnover in Norway is high - over half a million workers change jobs each year out of a total 
workforce of 2.5 million – the extent of cross-sectoral crossings have been limited (OECD 
2007:73). Recent reforms such as the system of national centres of expertise and regional 
research funds represent steps towards decentralization. The question is whether these 
activities suffice to counteract post-NPM centralization trends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 In the early 1990s a small industrial community close to the polar circle was searching for new industrial 
activities to replace operations at one of the local plants. By chance the community formed an alliance with a 
researcher entrepreneur looking for a production site and the financing of the production of a new product: 
silicium wafers to the solar energy industry. The project got started through financing from the district 
development fund and local banks. In addition public money was granted for further training of the local 
workforce in order to support the survival of the community (Hansson 2008). This was the start of a company 
that today is world leader in this business and of a new industry sector in Norway. By profiting on a highly 
qualified work force and new forms of work organization the newly established company REC managed to 
achieve top quality wavers. 
 
